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This paper describes our methodology for building conformant planners, which is based
on recent advances in the theory of action and change and answer set programming. The
development of a planner for a given dynamic domain starts with encoding the knowledge
about ﬂuents and actions of the domain as an action theory D of some action language.
Our choice in this paper is AL – an action language with dynamic and static causal laws
and executability conditions. An action theory D of AL deﬁnes a transition diagram T (D)
containing all the possible trajectories of the domain. A transition 〈s,a, s′〉 belongs to T (D)
iff the execution of the action a in the state s may move the domain to the state s′.
The second step in the planner development consists in ﬁnding a deterministic transition
diagram T lp(D) such that nodes of T lp(D) are partial states of D, its arcs are labeled by
actions, and a path in T lp(D) from an initial partial state δ0 to a partial state satisfying the
goal δ f corresponds to a conformant plan for δ0 and δ f in T (D). The transition diagram
T lp(D) is called an ‘approximation’ of T (D). We claim that a concise description of an
approximation of T (D) can often be given by a logic program π(D) under the answer
sets semantics. Moreover, complex initial situations and constraints on plans can be also
expressed by logic programming rules and included in π(D). If this is possible then the
problem of ﬁnding a parallel or sequential conformant plan can be reduced to computing
answer sets of π(D). This can be done by general purpose answer set solvers. If plans are
sequential and long then this method can be too time consuming. In this case, π(D) is
used as a speciﬁcation for a procedural graph searching conformant planning algorithm.
The paper illustrates this methodology by building several conformant planners which
work for domains with complex relationship between the ﬂuents. The eﬃciency of the
planners is experimentally evaluated on a number of new and old benchmarks. In addition
we show that for a subclass of action theories of AL our planners are complete, i.e., if in
T lp(D) we cannot get from δ0 to a state satisfying the goal δ f then there is no conformant
plan for δ0 and δ f in T (D).
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
A conformant planner is a program that generates a sequence of actions, which achieves a goal from any possible initial
state of the world, given the information about the initial state and the possible effects of actions. Such sequences are
normally referred to as conformant plans. In this paper we describe our methodology for the design and implementation of
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: tuphan@microsoft.com (P.H. Tu), tson@cs.nmsu.edu (T.C. Son), mgelfond@cs.ttu.edu (M. Gelfond), ricardo@cs.ttu.edu (A.R. Morales).0004-3702/$ – see front matter © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.artint.2010.04.007
80 P.H. Tu et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 175 (2011) 79–119conformant planners. The methodology is rooted in the ideas of declarative programming [42] and utilizes recent advances
in answer set programming and the theory of action and change. This allows the designer to guarantee a substantially
higher degree of trust in the planners’ correctness, as well as a greater degree of elaboration tolerance [43].
The design of a declarative solution of a problem P normally involves the selection of a logical language capable of
representing knowledge relevant to P . We base our methodology on representing such knowledge in action languages
– formal models of parts of natural language used for reasoning about actions and their effects. A theory in an action
language (often called an action description) is used to succinctly describe the collection of all possible trajectories of a
given dynamic domain. Usually this is done by deﬁning the transition diagram, T (D), of an action description D. The states
of T (D) correspond to possible physical states of the domain represented by D. Arcs of T (D) are labeled by actions.
A transition 〈s,a, s′〉 ∈ T (D) if the execution of the action a in the state s may move the domain to the state s′ . In some
action languages, actions are elementary (or atomic). In some others, an action a is viewed as a ﬁnite non-empty collection
of elementary actions. Intuitively, execution of an action a = {e1, . . . , en}, where the ei ’s are elementary actions, corresponds
to the simultaneous execution of every ei ∈ a.
There are by now a large number of action languages (see for instance [8,24,25,32,41,67]) capturing different aspects
of dynamic domains. Our choice in this paper is AL [8] – an action language with dynamic causal laws describing direct
effects of actions, impossibility conditions stating the conditions under which an action cannot be executed, and static causal
laws (a.k.a. state constraints) describing static relations between ﬂuents. For example the statement “putting a block A on top
of block B causes A to be on top of B” can be viewed as a dynamic causal law describing the direct effect of action put(A, B).
The statement “a block A cannot be put on B if there is a block located on A or on B” represents an impossibility condition.
The statement “block A is above block C if A is on C or it is on B and B is above C” is an example of a (recursive) static causal
law. Note that static causal laws can cause actions to have indirect effects. Consider for instance the effects of executing the
action put(A, B) in a state in which both A and B are clear and B is located above some block C . The direct effects of
this action (described by the dynamic causal law above) is on(A, B). An indirect effect, above(A,C), is obtained from our
static causal law. The problem of determining such indirect effects, known as the ramiﬁcation problem, remained open for
a comparatively long time. In the last decade, several solutions to this problem have been proposed, for example [5,38,28,
37,41,53,54,46,64]. One of these solutions [41] is incorporated in the semantics of AL. The ability to represent causal laws
makes AL a powerful modeling language. It was successfully used for instance to model the reactive control system of the
space shuttle [4]. The system consists of fuel and oxidizer tanks, valves and other plumbing needed to provide propellant
to the maneuvering jets of the shuttle. It also includes electronic circuitry; both to control the valves in the fuel lines and
to prepare the jets to receive ﬁring commands. Overall, the system is rather complex, in that it includes 12 tanks, 44 jets,
66 valves, 33 switches, and around 160 computer commands (computer-generated signals). The use of static causal laws
(including recursive ones) was crucial for modeling the system and for the development of industrial size planning and
diagnostic applications.
While static causal laws have been intensively studied by researchers interested in knowledge representation, they have
rarely been considered by the mainstream planning community. Although the original speciﬁcation of the Planning Domain
Description Language (PDDL) – a language frequently used for the speciﬁcation of planning problems by the planning com-
munity – includes axioms1 (which correspond to non-recursive static causal laws in our terminology) [27], most of the
planning domains investigated by this community, including those used for planning competitions [1,17,40] do not include
axioms. This is partly due to the fact that the semantics for PDDL with axioms is not clearly speciﬁed, and partly to the
(somewhat mistaken but apparently widespread) belief that static causal laws can always be replaced by dynamic causal
laws. There is fortunately also an opposing view. For instance, in [63], the authors argue that the use of axioms not only
increases the expressiveness and elegance of the problem representation but also improves the performance of planners. It
is known that the complexity of the conformant planning problem is much higher than classical planning in deterministic
domains (Σ P2 vs. NP-complete) [6,68], and hence the question of eﬃciency becomes even more important.
An action description D of AL describing the corresponding dynamic domain can be used for multiple purposes in-
cluding classical planning and diagnostics (see for instance [3,4,7,35]). One way to attack this problem is to replace the
transition diagram T (D) by a deterministic transition diagram T lp(D) such that nodes of T lp(D) are partial states of D, its
arcs are labeled by actions, and a path in T lp(D) from an initial partial state δ0 to a partial state satisfying δ f corresponds
to a conformant plan for δ0 and δ f in T (D). The transition diagram T lp(D) is called an approximation of T (D). Even though
T lp(D) normally has many more states than T (D) does, validating whether a given sequence of actions is a conformant plan
using T lp(D) is much easier. As pointed out in [6] the use of an approximation can substantially help reduce the complexity
of the planning problem. Indeed, an approximation in domains with incomplete information and static causal laws has been
developed and applied successfully in the context of conditional and conformant planning in [66]. Of course a drawback of
this approach is the possible incompleteness of approximation based planners, i.e., existence of solvable planning problems
for which such a planner might not ﬁnd a solution.
According to this methodology the second step in the development of a conformant planner consists in ﬁnding a suitable
approximation of T (D). We claim that a concise description of an approximation of T (D) can often be given by a logic
program π(D) under the answer sets semantics [26,62]. Moreover, complex initial situations and constraints on plans can
1 In our view, static causal laws can be used to represent relationships between ﬂuents and thus could be considered as axioms in PDDL.
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parallel or sequential conformant plan can be reduced to computing answer sets of π(D). This can be done by general
purpose answer set solvers (e.g., [19,33,55]).
If plans are sequential and long then this method can be too time consuming. In this case, the system designer may use
π(D) as a speciﬁcation for a procedural graph searching conformant planning algorithm.
This paper illustrates the proposed methodology by building several conformant planners which take as input an action
description of AL, an incomplete description of an initial situation, and a description of the goal. In summary, the main
contributions of this paper are
• A new approach to deﬁning and computing an approximation of the transition graph of action theories with incomplete
initial situation, static causal laws, and parallel actions;
• A suﬃcient condition for the completeness of the reasoning and/or planning tasks which employ the approximated
transition diagram instead of the possible world semantics; and
• Different approximation-based planners that can generate sequential and/or parallel conformant plans. These include
the planner CPasp and CpA. The former is a logic programming based planner and can generate both minimal and
parallel conformant plans while the latter is a heuristic forward search planner, implemented in C++, and can only
generate sequential plans.
• The introduction of fairly simple planning problems with static causal laws that appear to be challenging for many
contemporary planners.
In addition, we discuss how complex initial situations and/or constraints on a planning problem can be easily incorporated
into our logic programming based planner.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the basics of the language AL including its syntax and
semantics, the logic programming representation of transition diagrams speciﬁed by AL action theories, and the problem
of conformant planning. In Section 3, we introduce the notion of an approximation of AL action theories and deﬁne a
deterministic approximation of an action theory D by means of a logic program π(D). In Section 4, we describe an imple-
mentation, in the answer set programming paradigm, of a conformant planner based on this approximation and investigate
its completeness in Section 5. Section 6 extends the results in the previous section to planning problems with disjunc-
tive initial states. In Section 7, we describe a heuristic based sequential planner whose basic component is a module for
computing the approximation. We provide a comparative study of the performance of our planners against state-of-the-art
conformant planners in Section 8. We discuss some advantages of the use of logic programming in conformant planning in
Section 9 and conclude in Section 10.
2. Background
We begin with a short review of the syntax and semantics of the language AL for domains with static causal laws from
[8,67], and the notion of a planning problem and its solutions.
2.1. Syntax
The signature Σ of an action theory of AL consists of two disjoint, non-empty sets of symbols: the set F of ﬂuents, and
the set A of elementary actions. By an action we mean a non-empty set a of elementary actions. Informally an execution of
an action a is interpreted as a simultaneous execution of its components. For simplicity we identify an elementary action
e with the action {e}. A ﬂuent literal (or literal for short) l is a ﬂuent or its negation. By ¬l we denote the ﬂuent literal
complementary to l, i.e., ¬( f ) = ¬ f and ¬(¬ f ) = f . An AL action theory is a set of statements of the following forms:
e causes l if ψ (1)
l if ψ (2)
impossible a if ψ (3)
where e is an elementary action, a is an action, l is a ﬂuent literal, and ψ is a set of ﬂuent literals from the signature Σ .
The set of ﬂuent literals ψ is referred to as the precondition of the corresponding statement. When the precondition ψ is
empty, the if part of the statement can be omitted. Statement (1), called a dynamic causal law, says that if e is executed
in a state satisfying ψ then l will hold in any resulting state. Statement (2), called a static causal law, says that any state
satisfying ψ must satisfy l. Statement (3), called an impossibility condition, says that action a cannot be executed in any state
satisfying ψ .
To illustrate the syntax of AL, let us consider an instance of (a variant of) the Bomb in the toilet domain [45].
Example 1. There are two packages p1 and p2 and two toilets t1 and t2. Each of the packages may contain a bomb which
can be disarmed by dunking the package into a toilet. Dunking a package into a toilet also clogs the toilet. Flushing a toilet
unclogs it. We are safe only if both packages are disarmed.
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pi ’s stand for packages, i ∈ {1,2}, p1 = p2
t j ’s stand for toilets, j ∈ {1,2}, t1 = t2
Fluents:
armed(pi): package pi contains the bomb
clogged(t j): toilet t j is clogged
safe: all the bombs are disarmed
Actions:
dunk(pi , t j): dunk package pi into toilet t j
ﬂush(t j): ﬂush toilet t j
Action theory:
impossible {dunk(pi , t j),ﬂush(t j)}
impossible {dunk(p1, t j),dunk(p2, t j)}
impossible {dunk(pi , t1),dunk(pi , t2)}
impossible dunk(pi , t j) if clogged(t j)
dunk(pi , t j) causes ¬armed(pi)
dunk(pi , t j) causes clogged(t j)
ﬂush(t j) causes ¬clogged(t j)
safe if ¬armed(1),¬armed(2)
¬safe if armed(1)
¬safe if armed(2)
Fig. 1. Dbomb , the bomb in the toilet theory.
Fig. 1 shows an action theory of AL, denoted by Dbomb , that describes the domain.2 There are four impossibility state-
ments in the action theory. The ﬁrst one says that “it is impossible to dunk a package into a toilet that is being ﬂushed”. The
second one states that “it is impossible to dunk two different packages into the same toilet at the same time”. The third one
says that “it is impossible to dunk a package into two different toilets at the same time”. Unlike the ﬁrst three statements
that specify physical impossibilities of concurrent actions, the last one speciﬁes physical impossibility of an elementary
action. It says that “it is impossible to dunk a package into a clogged toilet”.
In addition to the impossibility statements, the action theory also includes statements to describe the effects of actions
dunk and ﬂush and the relationship between the ﬂuents safe and armed.
2.2. Semantics
Intuitively, an AL action theory describes a transition diagram containing all possible trajectories of the corresponding
domain. Before providing the precise deﬁnition of such a transition diagram, let us introduce some terminology and notation.
Given an action theory D, a set σ of ﬂuent literals is consistent if it does not contain two complementary ﬂuent literals.
We say that σ is complete if for every ﬂuent f , either f or ¬ f belongs to σ . A ﬂuent literal l holds in σ if l belongs to σ ;
l possibly holds in σ if ¬l does not belong to σ . A set γ of ﬂuent literals holds (resp. possibly holds) in σ if every ﬂuent
literal in γ holds (resp. possibly holds) in σ .
A set of ﬂuent literals σ is closed under a static causal law (2) if l holds in σ whenever ψ holds in σ . By ClD(σ ) we
denote the smallest set of ﬂuent literals that contains σ and is closed under the static causal laws of D.
A state s is a complete, consistent set of ﬂuent literals closed under the static causal laws of D. An action b is said to
be prohibited in s if D contains an impossibility condition (3) such that ψ holds in s and a ⊆ b; otherwise, b is said to be
executable in s. An action is executable in a set of states S if it is executable in every state s ∈ S .
Given a state s and an action a that is executable in s, a ﬂuent literal l is called a direct effect of a in s if there exists a
dynamic causal law (1) such that e ∈ a and ψ holds in s. By de(a, s) we denote the set of all direct effects of a in s.
The action theory D describes a transition diagram T (D) whose nodes correspond to possible physical states of the
domain and whose arcs are labeled with actions. The transitions of the diagram are deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1. For an action a and two states s and s′ , a transition 〈s,a, s′〉 ∈ T (D) iff a is executable in s and s′ =
ClD(de(a, s) ∪ (s ∩ s′)).
Intuitively 〈s,a, s′〉 ∈ T (D) indicates that if the system is in state s then after the execution of a the system may move
in state s′ . Such state s′ is called a possible successor state of s as a result of the execution of a. If action a is clear from the
context then we simply say that s′ is a possible successor state of s. It is worth to note that for action theories without
concurrent actions, the equation in Deﬁnition 1 is equivalent to the one proposed in [41].
Example 2. Consider the action theory Dbomb from Example 1. Let
2 Note that in the description of an action theory, we often use typed variables. A statement with variables are understood as a shorthand for the
collection of its ground instances.
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{
armed(1),armed(2),¬clogged(1),¬clogged(2),¬safe}
and
a = {dunk(1,1),dunk(2,2)}
Then
s1 =
{¬armed(1),¬armed(2), clogged(1), clogged(2), safe}
is the unique successor state of s0, i.e., 〈s0,a, s1〉 ∈ T (Dbomb), because
ClDbomb
(
de(a, s0) ∪ (s0 ∩ s1)
)= ClDbomb({¬armed(1),¬armed(2), clogged(1), clogged(2)}∪ ∅)
= {¬armed(1),¬armed(2), clogged(1), clogged(2), safe}= s1
Note that safe belongs to the closure of σ = {¬armed(1),¬armed(2), clogged(1), clogged(2)} because Dbomb contains the
static causal law
safe if ¬armed(1),¬armed(2)
and both ¬armed(1) and ¬armed(2) hold in σ .
Now let
b = {dunk(1,1),ﬂush(2)}
Then,
s2 =
{¬armed(1),armed(2), clogged(1),¬clogged(2),¬safe}
is the unique successor state of s0, i.e., 〈s0,b, s2〉 ∈ T (Dbomb).
We next deﬁne the notion of a consistent action theory.
Deﬁnition 2 (Consistent action theory). An action theory D is consistent if for any state s and action a executable in s, there
exists at least one state s′ such that 〈s,a, s′〉 ∈ T (D).
Observe that action AL-theories could be non-deterministic and therefore determining whether or not a given action
theory is consistent is not a simple task. Indeed, we can prove the following complexity result.
Theorem 1. Deciding whether or not a given action theory is consistent is an NP-complete problem.
The proof of this theorem is a straightforward reformulation of a similar result in [68] and is therefore not presented
here.
It is worth mentioning that the problem is a P-problem for action theories without static causal laws.
Example 3 (Consistent and inconsistent action theories). Consider the following action theory:
D0 =
{
e causes f if g
e causes ¬ f if h
We have that e is executable in s = { f , g,h}. If s′ is a successor state of s then it is easy to see that both f and ¬ f belong
to s′ . This is a contradiction because s′ must be consistent. Hence, there exists no successor state for s. According to the
above deﬁnition, this implies that D0 is inconsistent.
However, if we add to D0 the following impossibility condition
impossible e if g,h
then the action theory will become consistent because e cannot be executed in any state in which both g and h holds.
Hence, at most one of the above dynamic causal laws takes effect, which guarantees the consistency of the theory.
The consistency of an action theory ensures that the execution of a legal action in a state yields at least one possible
successor state. In this paper, we are interested in consistent action theories only. We will next deﬁne the notion of deterministic
action theory.
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most one state s′ such that 〈s,a, s′〉 ∈ T (D).
It is easy to see that if an action theory D does not contain any static causal laws then it is deterministic. In the presence
of static causal laws, an action theory, however, may be non-deterministic.3 The following example shows such an action
theory.
Example 4 (Non-deterministic action theory). Consider the following action theory:
D1 =
{ e causes f
g if f ,¬h
h if f ,¬g
Let s0 = {¬ f ,¬g,¬h}. We can verify that 〈s0, e, s1〉 ∈ T (D1) and 〈s0, e, s2〉 ∈ T (D1) where s1 = { f ,h,¬g} and s2 =
{ f , g,¬h}. Hence, by deﬁnition, D1 is non-deterministic.
For our later discussion, the following deﬁnition will be useful.
Deﬁnition 4 (Entailment). Let D be an action theory and M be a path in T (D), i.e., M is an alternate sequence of states and
actions 〈s0,a0, s1, . . . ,an−1, sn〉 such that 〈si,ai, si+1〉 ∈ T (D) for 0 i < n. We say that M entails a set of ﬂuent literals σ ,
written as M | σ , if σ holds in sn .
For a path M = 〈s0,a0, s1, . . . ,an−1, sn〉 in T (D), s0 and sn are referred to as the initial state and ﬁnal state, respectively,
of M . The sequence of actions α = 〈a0, . . . ,an−1〉 is referred to as a chain of events. We also say that M is a model of α and
sometimes write 〈s0,α, sn〉 ∈ T (D) to denote that there exists a model of α whose initial state and ﬁnal state are s0 and sn
respectively.
A chain of events α = 〈a0,a1, . . . ,an−1〉 is executable in a state s if either (i) n = 0, i.e., α is an empty chain of events,
or (ii) a0 is executable in s and 〈a1, . . . ,an−1〉 is executable in every s′ such that 〈s,a, s′〉 ∈ T (D). A chain of events is
executable in a set of states S if it is executable in every state s ∈ S .
2.3. A logic programming representation of T (D)
We now describe a logic program, called lp(D), which can be used to compute the transitions in T (D). lp(D) con-
sists of rules for reasoning about the effects of actions. Among these rules, the inertial rule encodes the solution to the
frame problem, ﬁrst discussed by John McCarthy and Pat Hayes in their landmark paper on reasoning about actions and
changes [44].
The signature of lp(D) includes terms corresponding to ﬂuent literals and actions of D, as well as non-negative integers
used to represent time steps. We often write lp(D,n) to denote the restriction of the program lp(D) to time steps between
0 and n. Atoms of lp(D) are formed by the following (sorted) predicate symbols:
• ﬂuent(F ) is true if F is a ﬂuent;
• literal(L) is true if L is a ﬂuent literal;
• h(L, T ) is true if the ﬂuent literal L holds at time-step T ; and
• o(E, T ) is true if the elementary action E occurs at time-step T .
In our representation, letters T , F , L, A, and E (possibly indexed) (resp. t , f , l, a, and e) are used to represent variables
(resp. constants) of sorts time step, ﬂuent, ﬂuent literal, action, and elementary action correspondingly. Moreover, we also
use some shorthands: if a is an action then o(a, T ) = {o(e, T ) | e ∈ a}. For a set of ﬂuent literals γ , h(γ , T ) = {h(l, T ) | l ∈ γ },
noth(γ , T ) = {noth(l, T ) | l ∈ γ }, ¬γ = {¬l | l ∈ γ }, and lit(ψ) = {literal(l) | l ∈ ψ}. The set of rules of lp(D) is divided into the
following ﬁve subsets4:
(1) Dynamic causal laws: for each statement of the form (1) in D, the rule:
h(l, T ) ← o(e, T−1), h(ψ, T−1), T > 0 (4)
belongs to lp(D). This rule states that if the elementary action e occurs at time step T − 1 and the precondition ψ
holds at that time step then l holds afterward.
3 This shows that there exist AL action theories with deterministic actions which cannot be represented in PDDL with deterministic actions and non-
recursive axioms.
4 For simplicity, we omit atoms of the form lit(l), lit(ψ), and step(T ) in the body of the rules.
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h(l, T ) ← h(ψ, T ) (5)
This rule states that if ψ holds at T then so does l.
(3) Impossibility conditions: for each statement of the form (3) in D, lp(D) contains the following rule:
← o(a, T ),not h(¬ψ, T ) (6)
This rule states that if the precondition ψ possibly holds at time step T then the action a cannot occur at that time
step.
(4) Inertia: lp(D) contains the following rule which solves the frame problem [44]:
h(L, T ) ← h(L, T−1),not h(¬L, T ), T > 0 (7)
This rule says that a ﬂuent literal L holds at time step T if it holds at the previous time step and its negation does not
hold at T .
(5) Auxiliary rules: lp(D) also contains the following rules:
← h(F , T ),h(¬F , T ) (8)
literal(F ) ← ﬂuent(F ) (9)
literal(¬F ) ← ﬂuent(F ) (10)
The ﬁrst constraint impedes two complementary ﬂuent literals from holding at the same time. The last two rules are
used to deﬁne ﬂuent literals.
For an action a and a state s, let
Φ(a, s) = lp(D,1) ∪ h(s,0) ∪ o(a,0) (11)
The next theorem states that the program lp(D) correctly implements T (D) (see [58,67]).
Theorem 2. (See [58,67].) Let s be a state and a be an action. Then 〈s,a, s′〉 ∈ T (D) iff there exists an answer set A of Φ(a, s) such
that s′ = {l | h(l,1) ∈ A}.
2.4. Conformant planning
The conformant planning problem, as investigated in this paper, has been discussed in [12–15,18,21,52,56] and in our
papers [60–62]. Given an action theory D, a set of ﬂuent literals δ is a partial state if it is a subset of some state s and
is closed under the static causal laws. Intuitively, a partial state represents the knowledge of an agent associated with D
about the current state of the world. For example, ∅ is a partial state of the action theory Dbomb because ∅ is closed under
the set of static causal laws of Dbomb and it is a subset of the state s0 in Example 2. Likewise, {armed(1),armed(2),¬safe}
is another partial state of Dbomb . However, {¬armed(1),¬armed(2)} is not a partial state of Dbomb because it is not closed
under the laws in Dbomb .
From now on, we will use symbols σ , s, and δ (possibly indexed) to denote a set of ﬂuent literals, a state and a partial
state respectively. For a partial state δ, the completion of δ, denoted by comp(δ), is the set of all states s such that δ ⊆ s.
A (conformant) planning problem is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 5. A planning problem P is a tuple 〈D, δ0, δ f 〉 where D is an action theory, and δ0 and δ f are partial states of D.
Observe that in this section we consider planning problems whose initial state description is a set of literals. More
general description will be considered in Sections 6 and 9. The solutions of a planning problem are deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 6. Let P = 〈D, δ0, δ f 〉 be a planning problem. A chain of events α = 〈a0, . . . ,an−1〉 is a solution of P if α is
executable in comp(δ0) and for every model M of α with the initial state in comp(δ0), M | δ f .
We often refer to such an α as a plan for δ f . If δ0 is a state and the action theory D is deterministic then α is called
a classical plan; otherwise it is a conformant plan. Furthermore, if each ai of α is an elementary action then α is called
a sequential plan; otherwise it is called a parallel plan. We next illustrate these deﬁnitions using the bomb-in-the-toilet
example.
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We can check that
α1 =
〈
ﬂush(1),dunk(1,1),ﬂush(1),dunk(2,1)
〉
and
α2 =
〈{
ﬂush(1),ﬂush(2)
}
,
{
dunk(1,1),dunk(2,2)
}〉
are two solutions of Pbomb . The ﬁrst one is a sequential plan, whereas the second one is a parallel plan.
3. Approximations of AL action theories
Let D be an action theory. In this section, we ﬁrst deﬁne what we mean by an approximation of the transition diagram
T (D) and discuss how approximations can be used to ﬁnd a solution of a planning problem. Then we introduce a logic
program for deﬁning such an approximation.
Let us begin with the deﬁnition of an approximation.
Deﬁnition 7 (Approximation). A transition diagram T ′(D) is an approximation of T (D) if
1. nodes of T ′(D) are partial states of D and arcs of T ′(D) are labeled with actions, and
2. if 〈δ,a, δ′〉 ∈ T ′(D) then for every s ∈ comp(δ),
(a) a is executable in s, and
(b) δ′ ⊆ s′ for every s′ such that 〈s,a, s′〉 ∈ T (D).
Intuitively, the ﬁrst condition describes that an approximation T ′(D) is a transition diagram between partial states and
the second condition requires T ′(D) to be sound with respect to T (D).
Given an approximation T ′(D), we will write 〈δ,α, δ′〉 ∈ T ′(D) to denote that there exists a path corresponding to α
from δ to δ′ in T ′(D) and by convention 〈δ, 〈〉, δ〉 ∈ T ′(D) for every partial state δ. We say that T ′(D) is deterministic if for
each partial state δ and action a, there exists at most one δ′ such that 〈δ,a, δ′〉 ∈ T ′(D). Even though approximations can be
non-deterministic, in this paper we are interested in deterministic approximations only. The next observation shows how
the soundness of an approximation extends from transitions to paths.
Observation 3.1. Let T ′(D) be an approximation of T (D). Then, for every chain of events α if 〈δ,α, δ′〉 ∈ T ′(D) then for
every s ∈ comp(δ),
(1) α is executable in s, and
(2) δ′ ⊆ s′ for every s′ such that 〈s,α, s′〉 ∈ T (D).
Observation 3.1 shows that given an approximation T ′(D), each path from δ to δ′ corresponds to a solution of the
planning problem 〈D, δ, δ f 〉, where δ f ⊆ δ′ . This gives rise to the following questions:
(1) How to ﬁnd an approximation of T (D)?
(2) How an approximation can be used to solve conformant planning problems?
In the rest of this section, we deﬁne an approximation of T (D) called T lp . In the next section, we will use T lp to
construct a conformant planner.
In our approach, the transitions in T lp(D) are deﬁned by a logic program π(D) called the cautious encoding of D.
Following the lp-function theory from [22], π(D) is obtained from lp(D) (see Section 2.3) by adding to it some new rules
and modifying the inertial rule (7) to allow π(D) to deal with partial states.
Let b be an action and δ be a partial state. We say that b is safe in δ if there exists no impossibility condition (3) such
that a ⊆ b and ψ possibly holds in δ. A ﬂuent literal l is a direct effect (resp. possible direct effect) of b in δ if there exists a
dynamic causal law (1) such that e ∈ b and ψ holds (resp. possibly holds) in δ. (Recall that a partial state is also a set of
ﬂuent literals and thus the concepts of “holds” and “possibly holds” are already deﬁned in Section 2.2.) Observe that if b is
safe in δ then b is executable in every state s ⊇ δ. Furthermore, the direct effects of b in δ are also the direct effects of b in
s which in turn are the possible direct effects of b in δ.
The program π(D): The signature of π(D) is the same as the signature of lp(D). As before, we write π(D,n) to denote
the restriction of π(D) to time steps between 0 and n. Atoms of π(D) are atoms of lp(D) and those formed by the
following (sorted) predicate symbols:
• de(l, T ) is true if the ﬂuent literal l is a direct effect of an action that occurs at the previous time step; and
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We still use letters T , F , L, E , and A (possibly indexed) to represent variables of sorts time step, ﬂuent, ﬂuent literal,
elementary action, and action correspondingly. π(D) includes
(1) the rules (4)–(6) and (8)–(10) from the program lp(D); and
(2) additional rules deﬁned as follows.
(a) For each dynamic causal law (1) in D, π(D) contains the rule
de(l, T ) ← o(e, T − 1), h(ψ, T − 1), T > 0 (12)
This rule encodes a direct effect of an elementary action e at the time step T . It says that if e occurs at time step
T − 1 and the precondition ψ holds then the ﬂuent literal l is a direct effect of e.
Since the agent’s knowledge about the state of the world at a time step might be incomplete, we add to π(D) the
rule to deﬁne what possibly holds after the execution of an action e at the time step T − 1:
ph(l, T ) ← o(e, T − 1),not h(¬ψ, T − 1),not de(¬l, T ), T > 0 (13)
This rule says that a ﬂuent literal l possibly holds after the execution of an elementary action e if (i) e occurs at the
previous time step; (ii) there exists a dynamic causal law (1) for e such that the precondition ψ possibly holds at
the previous step; and (iii) ¬l is not a direct effect of some action occurring in the previous time step.
(b) For each static causal law (2) in D, π(D) contains the rule:
ph(l, T ) ← ph(ψ, T ) (14)
This rule states that if ψ possibly holds at T then so does l.
(c) In addition, π(D) contains the following rule
ph(L, T ) ← not h(¬L, T−1),not de(¬L, T ), T > 0 (15)
This rule completes the deﬁnition of the predicate ph. It deﬁnes what possibly holds by inertia: a ﬂuent literal
possibly holds if (i) it possibly holds at the previous time step; and (ii) its negation is not a direct effect of an
action occurring in the previous time step.
(d) Finally, the inertial law is encoded in π(D) as follows:
h(L, T ) ← not ph(¬L, T ), T > 0 (16)
which says that L holds at the time moment T > 0 if its negation does not possibly hold at T .
For an action a and a partial state δ, let
Π(a, δ) = π(D,1) ∪ h(δ,0) ∪ o(a,0) (17)
Then, the program Π(a, δ) has the following property.
Proposition 1. Let δ be a partial state and a be an action. If Π(a, δ) is consistent then it has a unique answer set B and δ′ = {l |
h(l,1) ∈ B} is a partial state.
Proof. See Appendix A.1. 
We deﬁne a transition diagram, called T lp(D), based on the program π(D) as follows.
Deﬁnition 8. Let T lp(D) be a transition diagram such that
(1) nodes of T lp(D) are partial states of D and arcs of T lp(D) are labeled with actions of D, and
(2) 〈δ,a, δ′〉 ∈ T lp(D) iff Π(a, δ) is consistent and δ′ = {l | h(l,1) ∈ B} where B is the answer set of Π(a, δ).
The next theorem states that T lp(D) is indeed an approximation of T (D) and furthermore it is deterministic.
Theorem 3. T lp(D) is a deterministic approximation of T (D).
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At this point, it is instructive to mention that an approximation for action theories with static causal laws has been
introduced in [66]. This approximation is an extension of the 0-approximation in [57]. The approximation deﬁned in this
paper is also an extension of the 0-approximation in [57]. Indeed, the following result holds (similar to Theorem 4.6 in
[65]).
Observation 3.2. Let D be action theory without static causal laws, δ be a partial state, and a be an action executable in δ.
Then, 〈δ,a, δ′〉 ∈ T lp(D) if and only if δ′ = Φ0(a, δ) where Φ0 denotes the 0-approximation in [57].
While the approximations in [57,62,66] are proposed in the context of a given action language, the approximation
proposed in this paper, ﬁrst published in [61], is applicable for action languages whose semantics can be speciﬁed by a
transition diagram. We note that the approximation proposed in this paper and the one in [66] deal with action theo-
ries with static causal laws and the one in [57] does not. Furthermore, only the approximation proposed in this paper is
applicable to transition diagrams which allow parallel actions.
The approximation in [66] is based on the idea of computing what can possibly change after an action is executed.
A ﬂuent literal l possibly changes its value after the execution of an action e if (a) it is a direct effect of e; or (b) there
exists some dynamic law [e causes l if ψ] such that ψ possibly changes; or there exists some static causal law [l if ψ] such
that ψ possibly changes. Furthermore, the approximation in [66] does not consider action theories with parallel actions.
As such, instead of computing what possibly holds (rules (13), (14), and (15)) and employing this result in the inertial law
(rule (16)), the planner in [66] implements rules for computing what possible changes as follows5:
pc(l, T ) ← o(e, T − 1),not h(¬ψ, T )
pc(l, T ) ← not h(l, T − 1), pc(l′, T ),not de(¬ψ, T )
h(l, T ) ← h(l, T − 1),not pc(¬l, T )
The ﬁrst rule is for a dynamic causal law of the form [e causes l if ψ] and the second rule is for a static causal law of
the form [l if ψ] with l′ ∈ ψ . The last rule encodes the inertial law. It is worth mentioning that the rule encoding the
inertial law (16) does not include the atom h(l, T − 1), i.e., it is applicable to ﬂuents whose value is unknown (w.r.t. the
approximation) before the execution of an action. For this reason, we now favor this approximation over the one developed
in [66].
Observe that T lp(D) and the approximation in [66] are incomparable in the sense that T lp(D) sometimes entails some
conclusions that could not be derived using the approximation in [66] and vice versa. For instance, for the theory
D2 = {a causes ¬h, ¬ f if g}
we have that 〈{ f },a, {¬h}〉 ∈ T lp(D) (or {¬h} is the partial state resulting from the execution of a in { f } according to the
approximation T lp ) whereas { f ,¬h} is the partial state resulting from the execution of a in { f } according to [66]. On the
other hand, for the theory
D3 =
{
a causes f a causes g if k g if f ,h
g if f ,¬h k if f p if g,q
}
we have that 〈{¬ f ,¬g,¬p,¬q},a, { f ,¬p,¬q,k}〉 ∈ T lp(D3) while { f ,k,¬q} is the partial state resulting from the execution
of a in {¬ f ,¬g,¬p,¬q} according to [66].
4. An approximation based conformant planner
Let P = 〈D, δ0, δ f 〉 be a planning problem. Observation 3.1 implies that for any (deterministic) approximation T ′(D) of
T (D), if α is a chain of events such that 〈δ0,α, δ′〉 ∈ T ′(D) and δ f ⊆ δ′ , then α is a solution of P . Because T lp(D) is a
deterministic approximation of T (D), we consider the following decision problem.
Conformant planning with respect to T lp(D): Given a planning problem P = 〈D, δ0, δ f 〉, determine whether P has a solu-
tion with respect to T lp(D).
The following complexity result is similar to Theorem 1 in [66].
Theorem 4. The conformant planning problem with respect to T lp(D) is NP-complete.
5 We adapt the encoding style used in this paper in encoding the approximation in [66].
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we describe how to construct a logic program from π(D) for this purpose. This logic program, denoted by π(P,n), has two
input parameters: a planning problem P and an integer n. The answer sets of π(P,n) contain solutions of length n of P .
Like π(D), the signature of π(P,n) includes terms corresponding to ﬂuent literals and actions of D. Rules of π(P,n)
include all the rules of π(D,n) and the following rules:
(1) Initial partial state encoding: we add to π(P,n) the following facts to describe the initial partial state
h
(
δ0,0
)
(18)
Note that the above is a shorthand for the set of facts {h(l,0) | l ∈ δ0}.
(2) Goal encoding: for each l ∈ δ f , π(P,n) contains the constraint:
← not h(l,n) (19)
This set of constraints makes sure that every ﬂuent literal in δ f holds in the ﬁnal state.
(3) Action generation rule: π(P,n) contains the following rules for generating action occurrences:
o(E, T ) ∨ ¬o(E, T ) ← T < n (20)
← not o(A, T ), T < n (21)
(Recall that A is the set of all actions.) These rules state that at any time step T < n at least one action occurs.6
The following theorem shows that we can use π(P,n) to ﬁnd solutions of P .
Theorem 5. Let C be an answer set of π(P,n) and let ai = {e | o(e, i) ∈ C} (0 i < n). Then, α = 〈a0, . . . ,an−1〉 is a solution of P .
Proof. See Appendix B. 
It is worth noticing that the program π(P,n) is similar to the one presented in [58] in that each of its answer sets
corresponds to a solution of the planning problem P . Nevertheless, there are two important differences between π(P,n)
and the program in [58]. π(P,n) can deal with incomplete initial situation and also considers parallel actions. None of these
aspects were considered in [58]. The program π(P,n) is strongly related to the planner in [66]. They differ from each other
in that they implement different approximations and π(P,n) can deal with parallel actions and the one in [66] cannot.
Theorem 5 implies that each answer set of π(P,n) corresponds to a solution of length n of P . To ﬁnd minimal solutions,
we run the program π(P,n) with n = 0,1, . . . sequentially until it returns an answer set (i.e., the ﬁrst n such that π(P,n)
is consistent). The chain of events corresponding to this answer set is a minimal solution of P . This framework is hereafter
referred to as the planner CPasp.7
As will be seen in Section 8, CPasp can solve a wide range of planning problems. However, it is incomplete, i.e. there
are some planning problems for which a solution exists but cannot be found by CPasp. A precise deﬁnition of the (in-)
completeness of CPasp is given below.
Deﬁnition 9 (Completeness and incompleteness of CPasp). Let P be a planning problem. We say that CPasp is complete with
respect to P if either (i) P does not have a solution; or (ii) P has a solution and there exists an integer n such that π(P,n)
is consistent. Otherwise, we say that CPasp is incomplete with respect to P .
Observe that Theorem 5 shows that if P does not have a solution then and π(P,n) is inconsistent for every n. One of
the main reasons for the incompleteness of CPasp is the inability of the program π(P,n) to do reasoning by cases. The
following example demonstrates this issue.
6 An alternative for this set of rules is a choice rule
1
{
o(E, T ): action(E)
}← T < n
which were introduced in [55].
7 CPasp stands for Conformant Planning using Answer Set Programming.
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e causes f if g
e causes f if ¬g
Let P4 = 〈D4,∅, { f }〉. Clearly 〈e〉 is a solution of P4 because either g or ¬g is true in any state belonging to comp(∅) and
thus one of the above dynamic causal laws would take effect when e is performed. Yet, it is easy to verify that this solution
cannot be generated by CPasp due to the fact that for every n, π(P4,n) does not have any answer set (Constraint (19)
cannot be satisﬁed).
The next example shows that not only conditional effects but also static causal laws can cause CPasp to be incomplete.
Example 7. Consider the action theory D5:
e causes f
g if f ,h
g if f ,¬h
We can check that 〈e〉 is a solution of the planning problem P5 = 〈D5, {¬ f ,¬g}, {g}〉 since e causes f to be true and the
two static causal laws make g become true whenever f is true.
Now suppose that the program π(P5,1) has an answer set C which corresponds to the plan 〈e〉. This implies that
o(e,0) ∈ C . Then, because of the rule (12), we have that de( f ,1) ∈ C . Furthermore, any atom of the form de(. . . , . . .) belongs
to C if and only if it is the head of a ground instance of the rule (12). Thus, the only atom of the form de(. . . , . . .) in C is
de( f ,1) ∈ C .
By rule (13), this implies that ph( f ,1) ∈ C . By rule (15), ph(¬g,1), ph(h,1), ph(¬h,1) all belong to C . By rule (16),
because ph(¬g,1) ∈ C , h(g,1) cannot belong to C . As a result, constraint (19) is not satisﬁed. This is a contradiction
because C must satisﬁes all the constraints of π(P5,1).
Hence, π(P5,1) does not have any answer set. In fact, we can verify that for any integer n, π(P5,n) does not have an
answer set. This implies that CPasp cannot ﬁnd a solution of P5.
The above examples raise a question about the applicability of CPasp: what kind of planning problems can CPasp solve?
Observe that the action theories presented in Examples 6 and 7 are rather artiﬁcial and are not likely to come up in the
speciﬁcation of real-world domains. In fact, the theories in Examples 6 and 7 can be simpliﬁed to D′4 = {e causes f } andD′5 = {e causes f } ∪ {g if h} respectively. It is easy to see that CPasp is complete with respect to the simpliﬁed domains. In
[59], we developed a transformation that removes such artiﬁcial situations. It is worth to mention that CPasp can solve all
benchmark problems with non-disjunctive initial state that we have encountered so far.
5. A suﬃcient condition for the completeness of CPASP
In this section, we present our initial study of the completeness of CPasp. Speciﬁcally, we introduce a class of planning
problems, called simple planning problems (Deﬁnition 14) with respect to which CPasp is complete. For convenience, given
an action theory D, for a set S of states and action a, by Res(a, S) we denote the set of possible successor states of states
in S after the execution of a, i.e.,
Res(a, S) = {s′ ∣∣ s ∈ S, 〈s,a, s′〉 ∈ T (D)}
For a chain of events α, by Res(α, S) we denote the set of possible states reachable from some state in S after the execution
of α, i.e.,
Res(α, S) = {s′ ∣∣ s ∈ S, 〈s,α, s′〉 ∈ T (D)}
Deﬁnition 10 (Simple action theories). A static causal law is simple if its precondition contains at most one ﬂuent literal. An
action theory D is simple if each of its static causal laws is simple.
By this deﬁnition, action theories without static causal laws are simple.8 Furthermore, we observe that many real world
static causal laws are simple in nature. For example, to represent the unique location of a robot at a time, we can use the
following collection of static causal laws:
8 This implies that all benchmarks used in the international planning competitions involve only simple action theories as static causal laws are not used
in their representation.
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Likewise, to represent the unique value of a multi-valued object obj, we can use:{¬value(obj, X) if value(obj, Y ) ∣∣ X = Y }
Observe that simple action theories can be translated into action theories without static causal laws by
• computing S(l) = {h | there exists a sequence l0 = l, . . . , ln = h such that li if li−1 for 1 i  n}, for each ﬂuent literal l,
and
• replacing a dynamic law [a causes l if ϕ] with the set of dynamic laws{
a causes h if ϕ
∣∣ h ∈ S(l)}
A main disadvantage of this approach lies in that the number of dynamic laws might increase quadratically in the number
of static laws.
To characterize situations in Examples 6–7, we deﬁne a notion of dependency between ﬂuent literals.
Deﬁnition 11 (Dependencies between literals). A ﬂuent literal l depends on a ﬂuent literal g , written as l  g , if one of the
following conditions holds.
(1) l = g .
(2) There exists a (dynamic or static) causal law of D such that l is the head and g belongs to the precondition of the law.
(3) There exists a ﬂuent literal h such that l  h and h  g .
(4) The complementary of l depends on the complementary of g , i.e., ¬l  ¬g .
Note that the dependency relationship between ﬂuent literals is reﬂexive, transitive but not symmetric. The next deﬁni-
tion is about the dependence between actions and ﬂuent literals.
Deﬁnition 12 (Dependencies between actions and ﬂuent literals). An action b depends on a ﬂuent literal l, written as b  l, if
(1) there exists an impossibility condition (3) such that a ⊆ b and ¬l ∈ ψ , or
(2) there exists a ﬂuent literal g such that b  g and g  l.
For a set of ﬂuent literals σ and a ﬂuent literal l, we write l  σ to denote that l  g for some g ∈ σ and l σ to denote
that there exists no g ∈ σ such that l  g .
The next deﬁnition characterizes when a set of states S representing the possible states of the world can be reduced to
a single partial state δ.
Deﬁnition 13 (Reducibility). Let S be a set of states, δ be a partial state, and σ be a set of ﬂuent literals. We say that S is
reducible to δ with respect to σ , denoted by S σ δ if
(1) δ is a subset of every state s in S ,
(2) for any ﬂuent literal l ∈ σ , there exists a state s ∈ S such that l (s \ δ), and
(3) for any action a, there exists a state s ∈ S such that a (s \ δ).
There are two interesting properties about the reducibility of a set of states. First, if S σ δ and S represents the set of
possible states of the world then to reason about (formulae composed from) σ , it suﬃces to know δ.
Proposition 2. Let D be a simple action theory, S be a set of states, δ be a partial state, and σ be a set of ﬂuent literals such that
S σ δ. Then,⋃
s∈S
s ∩ σ = δ ∩ σ
Proof. See Appendix C.1. 
The reducibility of a set of states is preserved along the course of the execution of actions.
Proposition 3. Let D be a simple action theory, S be a set of states, δ be a partial state, and σ be a set of ﬂuent literals such that
S σ δ. For any action a, if a is executable in S then
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(2) Res(a, S) σ δ′ where 〈δ,a, δ′〉 ∈ T lp(D).
Proof. See Appendix C.2. 
The second property can be extended to a chain of events α as follows.
Proposition 4. Let D be a simple action theory, S be a set of states, δ be a partial state, and σ be a set of ﬂuent literals such that
S σ δ. For any chain of events α, if α is safe in S then
(1) α is safe in δ
(2) Res(a, S) σ δ′ where 〈δ,a, δ′〉 ∈ T lp(D).
Proof. See Appendix C.3. 
We deﬁne a class of planning problems, called simple planning problems, as follows.
Deﬁnition 14 (Simple planning problems). A planning problem 〈D, δ0, δ f 〉 is simple if
(1) D is simple, and
(2) comp(δ0) δ f δ0.
The following theorem states that for the class of simple planning problems the planner CPasp is complete.
Theorem 6. Let P = 〈D, δ0, δ f 〉 be a planning problem. If P is simple then CPasp is complete with respect to P .
Proof. See Appendix C.4. 
We would like to conclude this section by relating our completeness condition for approximation based reasoning in
action theories with incomplete initial state to other works. The proposed condition is strongly related to the result in [60],
in which a completeness condition was developed for action theories without static causal laws.9 Observe that the proofs
of this result in [60] make use of different techniques while the proofs of the completeness result in this paper relies on
techniques developed by the logic programming community.
In [49], Palacios and Geffner presented several translations that convert a planning problem P = 〈D, δ0, δ f 〉 into a clas-
sical planning problem P ′ = 〈D′, γ 0, γ f 〉 (γ 0 is complete) whose solutions can be computed using classical planners (e.g.
FF). A translation might introduce new ﬂuents and actions. Roughly, the completeness of a translation depends on the set
of new ﬂuents and actions. The authors of [49] identiﬁed a class of complete translations. They can be characterized by the
width of the problem, which depends on a relevance relation between literals. This relation is similar to the dependency
relation between literals in Deﬁnition 11. Similar to [60], the approach in [49] does not deal with action theories with static
causal laws. Nor does it consider parallel actions.
The determinicity of T lp(D) and the fact, that computing the result of the execution of an action in a given partial state
can be done in polynomial time (in the size of the theory), imply that computing the result of the execution of an action
sequence from a given state can be done in polynomial time. In other words, the temporal projection problem [30] in the
class of simple action theories is tractable. This result is similar to the result developed by Liu and Levesque in [39]. As with
other works, the work [39] does not deal with static causal laws or parallel actions.
6. A logic programming based planner for disjunctive initial state
Besides being sometimes incomplete, another weakness of CPasp is that it does not consider planning problems with
disjunctive information about the initial state. We call such problems disjunctive planning problems and formally deﬁne them
as follows.
Deﬁnition 15 (Disjunctive planning problems). A disjunctive planning problem P is a tuple 〈D,Δ0, δ f 〉 where D is an action
theory, Δ0 is a non-empty set of partial states and δ f is a partial state.
9 This result is similar to Theorem 4 in [60]. Theorem 3 in [60] is incorrect but this does not invalidate Theorem 4. A corrected version of Theorem 3 can
be found in [65].
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a singleton set. Solutions of a disjunctive planning problem are deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 16. A chain of events α = 〈a0, . . . ,an−1〉 is a solution of a disjunctive planning problem P = 〈D,Δ0, δ f 〉 if for
every δ0 ∈ Δ0, α is a solution of the planning problem 〈D, δ0, δ f 〉.
Example 8. Consider the domain
D6 =
{
e causes f if g
e causes f if h
and let Δ0 = {{g}, {h}} and δ f = { f }. Then, P6 = 〈D6,Δ0, δ f 〉 is a disjunctive planning problem. By Deﬁnition 16, it is easy
to see that α = 〈{e}〉 is a solution of P6.
It turns out that the framework in the previous section can be naturally extended to ﬁnd solutions of a disjunctive
planning problem P . First, we extend the program π(D) to deal with explicit disjunctive information about the initial
state; the newly extended program will be referred to as Γ (D). Then, we construct a program Γ (P,n) from Γ (D) so that
every answer set of Γ (P,n), if exists, represents a solution of P .
The basic idea in the development of Γ (D) is based on the approach in [66]. We add a second constant to Γ (D), called
worlds, to denote the number of initial partial states in Δ0, i.e., worlds = |Δ0|. With the exception of the predicate o(A, T )
and the auxiliary predicates (e.g., literal(L), ﬂuent(F ), etc.), every other predicate of π(D) is modiﬁed to accept a third
parameter W to indicate the possible world that the reasoner may be in during the execution of the plan, in the following
way:
• h(l, T ,W ) is true if the ﬂuent literal l holds at time-step T in the world W ;
• de(l, T ,W ) is true if the ﬂuent literal l is a direct effect of an action that occurs at the previous time step in the
world W ; and
• ph(l, T ,W ) is true if ﬂuent literal l possibly holds at time step T in the world W .
The rules of Γ (D) are obtained from the rules of π(D) by replacing predicates h(l, T ), de(l, T ) and ph(l, T ) with the
new predicates h(l, T ,W ), de(l, T ,W ) and ph(l, T ,W ) respectively. For example, the rule (4) will become
h(l, T + 1,W ) ← o(e, T ),h(ψ, T ,W )
Similarly, the rule (13) becomes
ph(l, T + 1,W ) ← o(e, T ),not h(¬ψ, T ,W ),not de(¬l, T + 1,W )
As before, we use the notation Γ (D,n) to denote the restriction of Γ (D) to the time step to take value between 0 and n.
Suppose Δ0 = {δ0, . . . , δk−1}. The program Γ (P,n) is constructed as follows:
(1) The value of the constant worlds is k.
(2) The set of rules of Γ (P,n) includes
(a) the rules of Γ (D,n), and
(b) for each δi ∈ Δ0, the rule
h(δi,0, i)
(c) for each l ∈ δ f and i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, the rule
← not h(l,n, i)
The following proposition establishes the relationship between Γ (P) and Π(P).
Proposition 5. Let P = 〈D, {δ0}, δ f 〉 and P ′ = 〈D, δ0, δ f 〉. A set of atoms A is an answer set of Γ (P,n) iff there exists an answer set
B of π(P ′,n) such that
(1) for every ﬂuent literal l, h(l, i,0) ∈ A iff h(l, i) ∈ B, and
(2) for every elementary action e, o(e, i,0) ∈ A iff o(e, i) ∈ B.
Theorem 7. Let P = 〈D,Δ0, δ f 〉 be a disjunctive planning problem. If A is an answer set of Γ (P,n) then α = 〈a0, . . . ,an−1〉, where
ai = {e | o(e, i) ∈ A}, is a solution of P .
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Input: An action theory D, an action a, and a partial state δ
Output: successor partial state of δ
1. Begin
2. de= ∅ pde = ∅ lit = F∪ ¬F
3. for each dynamic causal law (1) in D do
4. if ψ holds in δ then de= de∪ {l}
5. if ψ possibly holds in δ then pde= pde∪ {l}
6. ph = Closure(D, (pde∪ (lit \ ¬δ)) \ ¬de)
7. return Closure(D,de∪ (lit \ ¬ph))
8. End
Fig. 2. An algorithm for computing the transition function of T lp .
Closure(D,σ )
Input: An action theory D and a set of ﬂuent literal σ
Output: ClD(σ )
1. Begin
2. σ1 = σ2 = σ
3. repeat
4. ﬁxpoint = true
5. for each static causal law (2) in D do
6. if ψ holds in σ1 and l /∈ σ2 then
7. σ2 = σ2 ∪ {l} ﬁxpoint = false
8. σ1 = σ2
9. until ﬁxpoint
10. return σ1
11. End
Fig. 3. Computing the closure of a set of ﬂuent literals.
Proposition 5 is intuitive and it is not diﬃcult to prove its correctness. The proof of Theorem 7 is similar to the proof of
Theorem 5 in Appendix B. Hence, we omit the proofs of both of them here for brevity.
7. Heuristic search through T lp
In the previous sections, we demonstrated the usefulness of approximations in planning in the logic programming
paradigm. The experiments (Section 8) show that CPasp is really good in planning with parallel actions and in domains
rich in static causal laws. However, it does not perform well in domains with large grounded representation. One of the
main reasons for this problem is because the current answer set solvers do not scale up well to programs that require large
grounded representation. Various approaches have been proposed to attack this issue from different perspectives [9,20]. To
further investigate the usefulness of approximations, we implemented a C++ sequential planner, called CpA, based on the
transition diagram induced by T lp . CpA employs the best ﬁrst search strategy with repeated state avoidance and the num-
ber of fulﬁlled subgoals as the heuristic function. The initial state is described as a CNF formula and thus CpA allows for
disjunctive information as well.
One of the main functions inside CpA is to compute the transition function speciﬁed by T lp . The algorithm for this
function is presented in Fig. 2. It takes as input an action theory D, an action a and a partial state δ and returns as output
the successor partial state of δ. Note that because T lp is deterministic, such a successor partial state exists and is unique,
provided that a is safe in δ. In the algorithm, variables de and pde denote the set of direct effects and the set of possible
direct effects respectively; ph is the set of ﬂuent literals that possibly holds in the successor partial state; and lit is the set
of all ﬂuent literals. The only for loop is to compute the sets of direct effects and possible direct effects.
The algorithm makes two calls to the Closure function (depicted in Fig. 3). The Closure function takes as input an action
theory D and a set of ﬂuent literals σ and returns as output ClD(σ ). This process is performed in the following steps. First,
the closure is set to σ . Then the function loops over the static causal laws, adding to the closure the head of static causal
laws whose bodies hold in the previous iteration. The loop terminates when no more ﬂuent literals can be added to the
closure.
The correctness of the algorithm is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 8. Let D be an action theory, a be an action, and δ be a partial state. If a is safe in δ then Res(D,a, δ) = δ′ iff 〈δ,a, δ′〉 ∈
T lp(D).
Proof. See Appendix D. 
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DNF representation of the initial state. Given an CNF representation of the initial state,10 CpA converts it into its internal
DNF representation. Naturally, this might be very time consuming and could affect the planner’s performance. Finding an
implementation of CpA that does not require an DNF representation of the initial state is an interesting topic but is beyond
the scope of this paper and is considered as one of our goals in the future.
8. Experiments
In this section, we will present our experimental evaluation of the performance of CPasp and CpA. The platform used for
testing CPasp is a 2.4 GHz CPU, 768 MB RAM machine, running Slackware 10.0 operating system. Experiments with CpA and
sequential planners are conducted on a 3.2 GHz CPU, 2 GB RAM, running Suse Linux 9.0 operating system. Every experiment
had a time limit of 30 minutes.
8.1. Evaluation of CPasp
8.1.1. Planning systems used
We compared CPasp with three other conformant planners: CMBP [15], DLVK [18], and C-Plan [14]; We selected these
planners because they are designed in spirit similar to CPasp (that is, a planning problem is translated into an equivalent
problem in a more general setting which can be solved by an off-the-shelf software system) and can directly deal with
static causal laws. The main difference between these planners and CPasp lies in the use of different types of reasoning
in searching for plans. CMBP, DLVK , and C-Plan use the possible world semantics whereas CPasp uses the approximation.
A brief overview of these planners is given below.
• CMBP (Conformant Model Based Planner): CMBP is a conformant planner developed by Cimatti and Roveri [15]. CMBP
employs BDD (Binary Decision Diagram) techniques to represent planning domains and search for solutions. CMBP
allows non-deterministic domains with uncertainty in both the initial state and action effects. However, it does not
have the capability of generating concurrent plans. The input language is the action language AR [28]. The version
used for testing was downloaded from http://www.cs.washington.edu/research/jair/contents/v13.html.
• DLVK: DLVK is a declarative, logic-programming-based planning system built on top of the DLV system (http:
//www.dbai.tuwien.ac.at/proj/dlv/). Its input language K is a logic-based planning language described in [18]. The ver-
sion used for testing was downloaded from http://www.dbai.tuwien.ac.at/proj/dlv/K/. DLVK is capable of generating both
concurrent and conformant plans.
• C-Plan: C-Plan is a SAT-based conformant planner. C-Plan works using a generate-and-test method. The input language
is the action language C [21,29]. C-Plan is primarily designed for generating concurrent plans.
8.1.2. Benchmarks
We prepared two test suites. The ﬁrst test suite contains sequential, conformant planning benchmarks and the second
contains concurrent, conformant planning benchmarks. Many benchmarks are taken from the literature (e.g. [12,14,18])
and some were developed for the international planning competition (e.g. [17]). To test the performance of our systems in
domains with static causal laws, we developed two simple domains which are rich in static causal laws.
Sequential benchmarks. The sequential benchmark test suite includes the following domains:
• BT(m,n): This domain is a variant of the well-known Bomb-In-the-Toilet domain. In this domain, there are m packages
and n toilets. One of the packages contains a bomb. The bomb can be disarmed by dunking the package that contains
it into a toilet. The goal is to disarm the bomb.
• BTC(m,n): This domain is similar to BT. However, we assume that dunking a package into a toilet will clog the toilet;
ﬂushing the toilet will make it unclogged.
• RING(n): The encoded version of this problem follows the encoding in the distribution of CFF. In this domain, the agent
can move (forward or backward) around a building with n-rooms arranged in a ring in a cyclic fashion. Each room has
a window which can be closed or open. Closed windows may be locked. Initially, neither the location of the agent nor
the states (open/locked) of the windows is known. The goal is to have all windows locked. A possible conformant plan
consists of performing actions forward, close, lock repeatedly. Notice that the initial location of the agent needs to be
represented as a disjunction.
Observe that the location of the agent satisﬁes the well-known static causal law stating that an agent cannot be in two
places at the same time. We therefore created a domain, called RING-C(n), by introducing this static causal law.
We should remark here that this domain is used in different ways in our experiments. In testing CPasp, we assume that
the location of the agent is known in the initial state. This is because CPasp does not deal with disjunctive information.
On the other hand, we assume that the location of the agent is unknown in the initial state when testing CpA.
10 In PDDL, this is speciﬁed by oneof- and or-clauses.
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right side also falls. There is a ball hanging close to the leftmost one. Touching the ball causes the ﬁrst domino to fall.
Initially, the states of dominoes are unknown. The goal is to have the rightmost domino fall.
• Gaspipe(n): The objective of this domain is to start a ﬂame in a burner which is connected to a gas tank through a
pipe line. The gas tank is on the left-most end of the pipe line and the burner is on the right-most end. The pipe line
is made of sections connected with each other by valves. The pipe sections can be either pressured by the tank or
un-pressured. Opening a valve causes the section on its right side to be pressured if the section to its left is pressured.
Moreover, for safety reasons, a valve can be opened only if the next valve on the line is closed. Closing a valve causes
the pipe section on its right side to be un-pressured. Static causal laws are useful in the representation of this domain.
One such law is that if a valve is open and the section on its left is pressured then the section on its right will be
pressured. Otherwise (either the valve is closed or the section on the left is un-pressured), the pipe on the right side is
un-pressured. The burner will start a ﬂame if the pipe connecting to it is pressured. The gas tank is always pressured.
The uncertainty in the initial situation is that the states of the valves are unknown. A possible conformant plan will be
to close all valves except the ﬁrst one (that is, the one that directly connects to the gas tank) from right to left and
then opening them from left to right.
• Cleaner(n, p): This domain is a modiﬁed version of the Ring domain in which instead of locking windows, the goal of
the agent is to clean multiple objects located in every room (there are p objects in each room). To contrast with the
Ring domain, we assume that initially, the agent is in the ﬁrst room and does not know whether or not any of the
objects are cleaned.
Concurrent benchmarks. There are four domains in this test suite, namely BTp , BTCp , Gaspipep and Cleanerp . The BTp and
BTCp domains are modiﬁcations the BT and BTC domains respectively in which we allow to dunk different packages into
different toilets at the same time. The Gaspipep domain is a modiﬁcation of the Gaspipe domain, which allows to close
multiple valves at the same time. In addition, it is possible to open a valve while closing other valves. However, it is not
allowed to open and close the same valve or open two different valves at the same time. The ﬁnal domain in the test suite,
Cleanerp , is a modiﬁed version of the Cleaner domain where we allow the robot to concurrently clean multiple objects in
the same room. Modiﬁcations to the Ring and Domino domain are not considered as these problems only have sequential
solutions.
8.1.3. Experimental results
We ran CPasp using the answer set solvers smodels [55] and cmodels [33] and observed that cmodels yielded better
performance in general. The running times of CPasp reported here were obtained using cmodels. The timing results for
the sequential benchmarks is shown in Tables 1 and 2, and the results for the concurrent benchmarks is shown in Table 3.
We did not test C-Plan on the sequential planning benchmarks since it was developed only for concurrent planning. In
these tables, times are shown in seconds; The “PL” column shows the length of the plan found by the planner. “−” denotes
that the planner did not return a solution within the time limit for some reasons: e.g., out of time or out of memory. “NA”
denotes that the problem was not run with the planner. Since both DLVK and CPasp require as an input parameter the
length of a plan to search for, we ran them inside of a loop in which we incrementally increase the plan length to search
for, starting from 1,11 until a plan is found. Notice that in this way CPasp is not only ﬁnding conformant plans but minimal
conformant plans with respect to the deﬁned approximation. For example, C-Plan and CPasp took 0.74 second and 2.72
second, respectively, to ﬁnd the solution for the BTC(6,2) problem. Nevertheless, CPasp’s solution is shorter.
As it can be seen in Table 1, in the BT and BTC domains CMBP outperforms both DLVK and CPasp on most problem
instances. In general, CPasp has better performance than DLVK on these domains. As an example, DLVK took more than
three minutes to solve BT(6,2), while it took only 0.77 seconds for CPasp to solve the same problem. In addition, within the
time limit, CPasp was able to solve more problems than DLVK . In the Ring domain, although outperformed by both CMBP
and DLVK in some small instances, CPasp is the only planner that was able to solve Ring(8).
CPasp works well with domains rich in static causal laws (Domino and Gaspipe). In the Domino domain, CPasp outper-
forms all the other planners in most of instances. It took only 2.41 seconds to solve Domino(2000), while both DLVK and
CMBP took more than one minute. In fact CPasp could scale up very well to larger instances, e.g., Domino(10000). In the
Gaspipe domain, CPasp also outperforms DLVK: it was able to solve all the problem instances while DLVK was able to solve
only the ﬁrst three problem instances.12
The Cleaner domain turns out to be hard for the planners: they could solve very small instances only. In this domain,
CPasp is outperformed by CMBP. To solve the Cleaner(6, 2), CMBP took only 4.1 seconds while CPasp took more than 3
minutes. However, CPasp performs better than DLVK in general: DLVK reported a timeout with the problem Cleaner(6, 2).
We have seen that CPasp can be competitive with CMBP and DLVK on the sequential benchmarks. Let us move our
attention now to the concurrent benchmarks. As can be seen from Table 3, CPasp outperforms both DLVK and C-Plan on
most instances of the BTp , BTCp , and Gaspipep domains. Furthermore, CPasp is the only planner that was able to solve all
11 We did not start from 0 because none of the benchmarks has a plan of length 0.
12 We tried to test this domain with CMBP but had some problem with the encoding. We contacted the author of CMBP and are still waiting for response.
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Sequential benchmarks: Bomb & Ring domains.
Problem CMBP DLVK CPasp
PL Time PL Time PL Time
BT(2, 2) 2 0.03 2 0.04 2 0.20
BT(4, 2) 4 0.17 4 0.55 4 0.41
BT(6, 2) 6 0.21 6 216.55 6 0.77
BT(8, 4) 8 0.63 – 8 6.73
BT(10, 4) 10 1.5 – 10 890.06
BTC(2, 2) 2 0.16 2 0.12 2 0.22
BTC(4, 2) 6 0.26 6 72.44 6 0.71
BTC(6, 2) 10 0.74 – 8 2.72
BTC(8, 4) – – –
BTC(10, 4) – – –
Ring(2) 5 0.06 5 0.10 5 0.52
Ring(4) 11 0.10 11 2.14 11 2.98
Ring(6) 17 0.48 – 17 44.43
Ring(8) – – 23 1424.07
Ring(10) – – –
Table 2
Sequential benchmarks: Domino, Gaspipe & Cleaner domains.
Problem CMBP DLVK CPasp
PL Time PL Time PL Time
Domino(100) 1 0.26 1 0.1 1 0.21
Domino(200) 1 1.79 1 0.35 1 0.28
Domino(500) 1 7.92 1 2.40 1 0.74
Domino(1000) 1 13.20 1 13.10 1 1.23
Domino(2000) 1 66.60 1 62.42 1 2.41
Domino(5000) 1 559.46 – 1 6.07
Domino(10000) – – 1 12.584
Gaspipe(3) NA 5 0.13 5 1.34
Gaspipe(5) NA 9 0.42 9 2.22
Gaspipe(7) NA 13 42.62 13 6.18
Gaspipe(9) NA – 17 39.32
Gaspipe(11) NA – 21 868.10
Cleaner(2, 2) 5 0.1 5 0.104 5 0.49
Cleaner(2, 5) 11 0.61 11 214.69 11 3.88
Cleaner(2, 10) – – –
Cleaner(4, 2) 11 0.13 11 14.82 11 2.09
Cleaner(4, 5) – – –
Cleaner(4, 10) – – –
Cleaner(6, 2) 17 4.1 – 17 224.39
Cleaner(6, 5) – – –
Cleaner(6, 10) – – –
the instances in the test suite. In the Cleaner domain, C-Plan is the best. To solve the Cleanerp(6, 10) problem, C-Plan took
only 0.35 seconds, whereas DLVK reported a timeout and CPasp needed 3.73 seconds. As CMBP does not produce concurrent
plans, it is not included in this table.
8.2. Evaluation of CpA
8.2.1. Planning systems used
We compared CpA with four conformant planners: CFF [12], KACMBP [16], t0 [49], and POND [13]. These planners were,
at the time of our experiments, known as the fastest conformant planners on most of the conformant planning benchmarks
in the literature.13 CFF [12] is superior to other state-of-the-art conformant planners like GPT [11], MBP [15]; KACMBP is
reported [16] to outperform DLVK and C-Plan in many domains in the literature. t0 [49] is known to be better than CFF
in many domains. We did not compare our planners with the PKS system [50] (improved in [51]) which employs a richer
representation language and the knowledge-based approach to reason about effects of actions in the presence of incomplete
13 In a recent planning competition, an improved version of CpA won the ﬁrst prize over t0 (see http://ippc-2008.loria.fr/wiki/index.php/Results). The
version of CpA used in this paper, however, is the version used at the time of the original submission of this paper.
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Concurrent benchmarks: Bomb, Gaspipe & Cleaner domains.
Problem C-Plan DLVK CPasp
PL Time PL Time PL Time
BTp (2, 2) 1 0.07 1 0.07 1 0.11
BTp (4, 2) 2 0.05 2 0.09 2 0.26
BTp (6, 2) 3 1.81 3 3.06 3 0.34
BTp (8, 4) 2 4.32 2 10.52 2 0.24
BTp (10, 4) – – 3 1.91
BTCp(2, 2) 1 0.05 1 0.05 1 0.13
BTCp(4, 2) 3 0.07 3 0.90 3 0.30
BTCp(6, 2) 5 7.51 5 333.27 5 0.67
BTCp(8, 4) – – 3 0.50
BTCp(10, 4) – – 5 1192.45
Gaspipep(3) – 4 0.08 4 0.40
Gaspipep(5) – 6 0.17 6 0.75
Gaspipep(7) – 8 0.44 8 1.22
Gaspipep(9) – 10 17.44 10 3.17
Gaspipep(11) – – 12 8.83
Cleanerp(2, 2) 3 0.05 3 0.07 3 0.26
Cleanerp(2, 5) 3 0.12 3 0.06 3 0.30
Cleanerp(2, 10) 3 0.06 3 0.07 3 0.30
Cleanerp(4, 2) 7 0.06 7 0.19 7 0.77
Cleanerp(4, 5) 7 0.09 7 0.80 7 0.93
Cleanerp(4, 10) 7 0.13 7 237.63 7 1.16
Cleanerp(6, 2) 11 0.11 11 4.47 11 1.98
Cleanerp(6, 5) 11 0.19 11 986.73 11 2.94
Cleanerp(6, 10) 11 0.35 – 11 3.73
information as most planners used in the comparison are domain-independent planners. A brief overview of these planners
is given below.
• KACMBP: KACMBP is an extension of CMBP. Similarly to CMBP, KACMBP uses techniques from symbolic model checking
to search in belief space. However, in KACMBP, the search is guided by a heuristic function which is derived based on
knowledge associated with a belief state. KACMBP is designed for both sequential and concurrent settings. The input
language of KACMBP is SMV. The system used in the experiments was downloaded from http://sra.itc.it/tools/mbp/
AIJ04/.
• Conformant-FF (CFF): CFF14 extends the classical FF planner [31] to deal with uncertainty in the initial state. The basic
idea is to represent a belief state s just by the initial belief state (which is described as a CNF formula) together with
the action sequence that leads to s. In addition, the reasoning is done by checking the satisﬁability of CNF formulae.
The input language of CFF is a subset of the PDDL language with a minor change that allows the users to specify the
initial state as a CNF formula. CFF supports sequential conformant planning. However, it does not support concurrent
and conditional planning.
• POND: POND extends the planning graph algorithm [10] to deal with sensing actions. Conformant planning is also
supported as a feature of POND. The input language is a subset of PDDL. The version for testing was obtained through
email communication with Daniel Bryce, author of POND. This is the version 1.1.1. of POND.
• t0 is the winner of the 2006 International Planning Competition, in the “Conformant Planning” category. t0 solves a
planning problem P by translating it into a classical planning problem P ′ . The earlier version of t0, called cf2cs(ff),
[48] is incomplete but t0 [49] is complete. As with other planners (e.g., CFF, POND), t0 does not deal with static causal
laws.
8.2.2. Benchmarks
We evaluated the performance of the planning systems on the four domains tested with CPasp: Ring, Domino, Cleaner,
and BTC. In addition, we use four other domains: Cube-Center (Cube-C), Logistic (Log), Sortnet, and UTS.
The Ring, Domino, BTC and Cleaner domains have been described in the previous section. We remark that the initial
location of the agent is unknown in the Ring domain for the experiments conducted in this section.
The Cube-Center(2k + 1) domain is described in [16]. In this domain, an agent can move up, down, left, and right in a
three-dimension grid of the size 2k + 1. A move results in the agent being in a corresponding cell (e.g., moving up, down
changes the y-coordinate of the agent) or being in the same cell (e.g., moving up when the y coordinate is 2k+ 1 does not
result in any change). The goal of the agent is to be at the center of the Cube. Initially, the agent does not know its location.
14 We would like to thank Jörg Hoffmann for providing us with an executable version of the system for testing.
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Classical domains: Ring, Cube-Center, BTC, and Logistics.
Prob. KACMBP CFF POND t0 CpA
size PL Time PL Time PL Time PL Time PL Time
Ring(n)
2 8 0.00 7 0.01 6 0.00 5 0.04 5 0.00
3 15 0.01 15 0.12 13 0.10 8 0.05 8 0.05
4 22 0.02 26 2.13 16 4.34 13 0.06 11 0.40
5 35 0.03 45 40.77 20 247.45 17 0.05 14 2.05
Cube-Center(n)
3 14 0.04 6 0.00 6 0.55 6 0.08 6 0.10
5 25 0.16 33 0.28 15 10.00 15 0.12 24 9.82
7 35 0.16 40 22.62 24 162.85 28 0.14 42 117.57
9 45 0.32 – – 45 0.32 73 797.84
11 55 0.36 – – 48 0.23 81 1405.24
BTC(p, t)
10, 1 19 0.01 19 0.01 19 0.00 19 0.06 19 0.00
20, 1 39 0.04 39 0.06 39 0.02 39 0.06 39 0.05
50, 1 99 0.35 99 2.18 99 0.19 99 0.10 99 0.64
100, 1 199 2.52 199 57.77 199 2.05 199 0.24 199 4.98
10, 5 15 0.06 15 0.01 15 0.01 15 0.03 15 0.03
20, 5 35 0.18 35 0.02 AB 35 0.06 35 0.12
50, 5 95 0.96 95 1.82 97 0.63 95 0.12 95 1.48
100, 5 195 3.94 195 53.49 195 1.80 195 0.42 195 9.85
10, 10 10 0.17 10 0.00 10 0.02 10 0.05 10 0.05
20, 10 30 0.55 30 0.03 30 0.13 30 0.08 30 0.31
50, 10 90 2.96 90 1.52 94 1.45 90 0.16 90 2.88
100, 10 190 17.42 190 47.85 194 17.97 190 0.42 190 16.84
Logistics(l, c, p)
2, 2, 2 14 0.13 16 0.00 16 0.07 16 0.05 10 0.11
2, 3, 3 34 161.13 24 0.00 30 1.49 24 0.08 48 7.43
3, 2, 2 14 0.12 20 0.02 22 0.45 20 0.08 44 3.33
3, 3, 3 40 0.19 34 0.03 38 24.07 34 0.11 350 340.09
4, 3, 3 – 37 0.04 37 34.32 36 0.15 –
The Logistic(l, c, p) domain is described in [12] and distributed together with CFF. In this domain, we need to transport
p packages between locations of c cities (each city has p locations) via trucks and airplanes. The uncertainty in the initial
state is that the exact locations of the packages are unknown in the beginning.
The Sortnet(n) and UTS(n) are two domains from the 2006 International Planning Competition, downloaded from http:
//www.ldc.usb.ve/~bonet/. The Sortnet(n) domain is a synthesis of sorting networks which has disjunctive goals and a large
number of possible initial states. The UTS(n) domain is the computation of universal transversal sequence for graphs. In this
domain, the goal is to visited all the nodes. To do so, an agent must start traveling. Afterwards, he/she can visit neighbor
nodes. The uncertainty lies in the initial location of the agent.
8.2.3. Experimental results
The experimental results are shown in Tables 4–7. Times are shown in seconds. “–” indicates that the planner did not
return a solution within the time limit and “NA” indicates that the problem is not applicable. “AB” denotes that the program
encountered some error and halted abnormally.
As can be seen in Table 4, in the Ring domain, KACMBP performs the best. t0 is almost as good as KACMBP. CFF and
POND on the contrary did not perform well on this domain. As explained in [12], CFF does not perform well on this domain
because of the lack of informativity of the heuristic function in the presence of non-unary effect conditions and the problem
with checking repeated states. Although CpA was able to solve all the instances, its performance is not as good as KACMBP
or t0, e.g., to solve Ring(5), CpA needed more than two seconds, while KACBMP or t0 needed less than 0.05 seconds.
A similar performance trend can be observed in the Cube-Center domain. t0 and KACMBP dominate in this domain and
t0 yields better performance and also shorter plans than KACMBP in large instances. CpA outperforms POND but is slower
than CFF in instances solvable by CFF. Again, CpA was able to solve all instances in this domain but its solutions are usually
longer than the solutions returned by other planners.
In the BTC domain, t0 is better in general. POND and KACMBP are comparable to each other. CpA is competitive with
others in many instances. It outperforms CFF, POND, and KACMBP in BTC(100, 10) but takes twice the time comparing to
POND and KACMBP in solving the BTC(100, 1) instance. It is interesting to observe that CFF and t0 seem to have no problem
when the number of toilets increases, while there is a signiﬁcant increase in the amount of time needed to ﬁnd a solution
for KACMBP, POND, and CpA. This increase is, however, less substantial for CpA than for KACMBPor POND. For example, if
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Domains with static causal laws and high degree of uncertainty: Ring-C, Domino, an Cleaner.
Prob. KACMBP CFF POND t0 CpA
size PL Time PL Time PL Time PL Time PL Time
Domino(n)
10 23 0.04 10 0.00 10 0.00 10 0.05 1 0.00
50 163 0.13 50 0.00 50 0.35 50 0.07 1 0.01
100 376 1.45 NA 100 4.51 100 0.21 1 0.02
200 852 16.42 NA 200 128.26 200 1.93 1 0.02
500 – NA 500 378.44 500 58.34 1 0.05
1000 – NA 1000 1258.17 1000 745.95 1 0.16
2000 – NA – – 1 0.52
5000 – NA – – 1 3.12
Cleaner(r,o)
2, 10 21 0.04 21 0.00 21 19.30 21 0.05 21 0.03
2, 20 41 0.36 41 0.02 – 41 0.08 41 0.19
2, 50 101 7.89 101 0.29 – 101 0.10 101 2.76
2, 100 201 113.99 201 3.48 – 201 0.23 201 22.71
5, 10 56 0.57 54 0.03 – 54 0.06 54 0.26
5, 20 106 4.75 104 0.27 – 104 0.10 104 1.78
5, 50 256 143.40 254 7.46 – 254 0.23 254 26.66
5, 100 – NA – 504 0.79 504 214.27
Ring with static causal laws, Ring-C(n)
10 85 0.49 – – 30 1.01 30 0.83
15 231 9.03 – – 45 6.76 45 5.57
20 270 503.99 – – 60 27.44 60 22.20
25 – – – 75 79.58 75 65.32
the number of packages is ﬁxed to 100 and the number of toilets increases from 5 to 10, the amount of time needed by CFF
even decreases, while the time needed by KACMBP increases about 5 times, CpA’s time doubles, and POND’s time increases
more than 10 times while t0’s remains the same.
In the Logistic domain, both KACMBP and CpA had diﬃculty in ﬁnding plans. Although KACMBP performs better than
CpA, its performance is far from that of CFF or t0, which solved every problem instance in less than one second. POND can
solve all problems but the time increases very fast. We believe that the poor performance of CpA on this domain lies in the
not-so-good heuristic function used. This is reﬂected in the lengths of the plans found by CpA.
Table 5 contains experimental results on the performance of the planners in domains that are different from domains
described in Table 4 in the following way: these domains are either rich in static causal laws or have a high degree of
uncertainty in the initial state. The domains encoded for CpA use static causal laws. These static causal laws are compiled
away in the encodings used for other planners, following the procedure suggested in [63].
In the Domino domain, with the exception of CpA, none of the other planners performed well. The reason being that this
domain is rich in static causal laws – a feature that is not directly supported by KACMBP, CFF, t0, or POND. Thus, we had
to compile them away when encoding this domain for these planners, which requires the introduction of extra actions and
ﬂuents. As a result, the performance of these planners is hit by an extra overhead that CpA is not affected with. It is worth
mentioning that the ‘NA’ in CFF’s column is due to some predeﬁned constants of the system (e.g. maximal plan length is
set to 500).
In the Cleaner domain, CpA also obtained good performance and it is the only planner that could solve all instances.
KACMBP behaves well only on small problems but does not scale up as well as CFF and CpA. CFF is very good at all instances
of the domain, except Cleaner(5, 100) where it reported the error message: “maximum length of plans is exceeded”. We
believe that this can easily be ﬁxed by increasing some constant for the maximum length of plans allowed. POND could not
solve only one instance in this set of problems. In this domain, the high degree of uncertainty in the initial state increases
with the number of objects.
It is interesting to observe how static causal laws affect the performance of CpA and how different reasoning method
could be useful in other planners. As we have mentioned before, the only difference between the Ring-C domain and
the Ring domain is that we add the encoding of the static causal laws “an agent cannot be at two different locations
at the same time” to the problem speciﬁcation. In the encoding used to run CpA, it is expressed as a static causal law.
This information is expressed in the encoding for other planners by adding the additional (negative) effects to the for-
ward/backward of the domain. For example, if we have three rooms 1, 2, and 3, the encoding for CpA will include the action
forward causes ini+1 if ini where i = 1, 2, 3 and in4 ≡ in1, and the static causal law ¬in j if ini for i = j; the encoding of
this action for other planners will have conditional effects of the form (when(in3)(in1 ∧ ¬in2 ∧ ¬in3)), etc. CpA yields the
best result in this domain. Only CpA and t0 were able to solve all instances of this problem. Neither CFF nor POND returned
a solution for the smallest instance of this domain (Ring-C(10)). The difference between t0 and CFF indicates that in this
domain, the method employed by t0 is better than that of CFF. It is likely that the translation t0 introduces only a few
actions and ﬂuents into the problem which ultimately results in better performance.
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Sortnet domains.
Problem KACMBP CFF POND t0 CpA
PL Time PL Time PL Time PL Time PL Time
Sortnet(1) 1 0.00 NA 1 0.00 NA 1 0.00
Sortnet(2) 3 0.00 NA 3 0.00 NA 3 0.00
Sortnet(3) 6 0.02 NA 5 0.00 NA 5 0.05
Sortnet(4) 10 0.05 NA 9 0.00 NA 9 0.40
Sortnet(5) 15 0.19 NA 12 0.01 NA 15 0.66
Sortnet(6) 21 0.20 NA 16 0.00 NA 21 9.76
Sortnet(7) 28 0.42 NA 19 0.01 NA 27 35.51
Sortnet(8) 36 0.76 NA 26 0.01 NA 35 117.41
Sortnet(9) 45 1.24 NA 31 ∗ NA 44 371.58
Sortnet(10) 55 2.18 NA 38 0.05 NA 55 1010.10
Sortnet(11) 66 3.22 NA 43 0.06 NA –
Sortnet(12) 78 5.55 NA 50 0.11 NA –
Sortnet(13) 91 8.24 NA 55 0.13 NA –
Sortnet(14) 105 20.62 NA 61 0.20 NA –
Sortnet(15) 120 28.54 NA 65 0.22 NA –
Table 7
UTS domains.
Problem KACMBP CFF POND t0 CpA
PL Time PL Time PL Time PL Time PL Time
k01 4 0.01 4 0.00 4 0.00 4 0.04 4 0.00
k02 11 0.20 10 0.00 12 0.01 11 0.06 12 0.03
k03 25 12.11 16 0.03 19 0.06 AB 20 0.28
k04 – 22 0.08 26 0.24 23 0.15 28 1.62
k05 – 28 0.33 33 0.67 29 0.25 40 7.69
k06 – 34 1.04 40 1.65 35 0.42 47 18.81
k07 – 40 2.57 47 3.55 41 0.73 57 51.52
k08 – 46 5.98 54 7.20 47 1.20 82 122.22
k09 – 52 12.09 61 14.02 53 1.91 81 217.95
k10 – 58 23.64 68 24.76 59 2.94 90 400.79
l01 – 4 0.01 4 0.00 4 0.05 4 0.00
l02 – 11 0.00 14 0.02 13 0.04 14 0.02
l03 – 17 0.01 23 0.08 23 0.07 30 0.36
l04 – 23 0.01 33 0.32 30 0.08 60 2.24
l05 – 29 0.33 46 1.11 47 0.14 53 9.32
l06 – 35 0.08 AB 62 0.22 89 24.75
l07 – 41 0.21 64 7.40 67 0.35 141 106.37
l08 – 47 0.45 70 16.99 64 0.70 213 456.24
l09 – 52 0.86 82 39.53 90 2.30 –
l10 – 58 1.60 88 100.00 85 4.12 194 1147.51
r03 – 17 0.02 17 0.08 19 0.07 18 0.23
r04 – 25 0.04 24 0.23 26 0.10 31 1.81
r05 – 33 1.47 32 0.65 34 0.20 50 9.94
r06 – 38 9.65 41 1.73 40 0.30 60 24.15
r07 – 47 1.60 53 4.14 44 0.59 105 98.41
r08 – 48 4.76 54 8.95 49 1.03 107 230.63
r09 – 62 3.82 64 17.44 57 1.46 146 480.28
r10 – 66 11.63 68 36.59 67 2.12 128 698.11
We have seen that CpA performed reasonably well in several domains. Let us now focus on its performance in the two
domains Sortnet (Table 6) and UTS (Table 7). As we have mentioned earlier, the Sortnet domain has disjunctive goals. The
two systems CFF and t0 does not consider problems with disjunctive goals. CpA does not consider disjunctive goals directly
and we have to introduce additional ﬂuents and static causal laws to encode the goal. For example, we replace a goal of
the form f ∨ g by the ﬂuents f g and add to the problem the set of static causal laws { f g if f , f g if g,¬ f g if ¬ f ∧ ¬g}.
We observe that this encoding is not applicable to the CFF and t0 systems. In this domain, POND is the best. It can solve
every instance in less than half a second with the exception of the instance Sortnet(9) where it halts abnormally. KACMBP
can solve all instances but it was much slower than POND. CpA, on the other hand, can only solve instances from 1 to 10
(when n = 11, the number of partial states in the initial state is 211). This domain indicates that the explicit representation
of the set of partial states used by CpA needs to be compensated in some ways for the planner to scale up.
Finally, Table 7 indicates that the UTS domain is also a challenging problem for CpA and KACMBP. In this domain, the
number of initial states is linear in the size of the problem. We believe that the heuristic used by CpA is not providing good
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requires much more time than other planners in large instances and also returns signiﬁcant longer plans. For example, in
the k10-problem, CpA needs 401 seconds while CFF and POND only require around 24 seconds and t0 needs less than 3
second; CpA’s plan is also contains 20 or 30 actions more than those of POND or CFF and t0. On the other hand, CpA can
solve all problems but one while KACMBP can solve only three smaller problems.
Observe that CpA relies on the approximation deﬁned by T lp(D) in its search for a solution. Therefore, it is, theoretically,
a sound but incomplete planner because T lp(D) is deterministic whereas D can be non-deterministic as discussed Section
2.2. To make sure that our approach can cover a broader spectrum of planning problems, we also tested CpA with classical
planning problems. The ﬁrst domain considered was the Blocks World, and we performed tests with ﬁve problem instances
described in [18]. We then tested with problems in the Rovers domain.15 We experimented with ﬁve problem instances,
different from each other in the numbers of way points, rovers, cameras, rock and soil samples, and objectives. It turns out
that CpA can solve all those problems.
9. Conformant planning – logic programming vs. heuristic search through approximation
The experimental results in the previous section indicate that the C++ planner CpA yields better performance than the
logic programming based planner CPasp in most of the sequential benchmarks. However, CPasp is competitive for the plan-
ning problems with short solutions. Our experimental results also show that in problems with complex static causal laws,
CPasp seems to do better than CpA and other state-of-the-art planners but it does not do well on large problems. One of
the main reasons for this weakness of CPasp is its reliance on a general answer set solver in computing a solution. On the
other hand, the use of logic programming brings a number of advantages. We will now discuss some of these advantages in
detail.
(1) Generating Parallel Plans: Logic programming based planners such as CPasp and DLVK can generate parallel plans. In
CPasp, this is achieved by the rules (20) and (21). On the other hand, most of the state-of-the-art planners do not
compute parallel plans.
(2) Incorporation of Control Knowledge and/or Preferences: Logic programming provides an ideal environment for adding con-
trol knowledge and/or preferences in searching for plans satisfying some qualitative criteria. For example, in the bomb
in the toilet domain with one package, ﬂushing the toilet followed by dunking the package ( f lush;dunk) is a plan
achieving the goal of having the package disarmed, even when we know that the toilet is unclogged in the initial sit-
uation. Although it is a valid solution, this plan is hardly a preferable one. The problem is that the action theory does
not include knowledge stipulating the planner not to consider such a plan when the plan with a single action dunk
would be suﬃcient. This type of knowledge cannot be represented by an impossibility condition for ﬂush. As such, for
planners relying on a ﬁxed representation language (e.g. PDDL), the incorporation of knowledge in planning requires a
lot of work (e.g. TPlan [2] develops separate modules to deal with temporal knowledge). In logic programming, we can
easily express the above knowledge by the constraint
← occ(ﬂush(t), T ),h(¬clogged(t), T )
which disallows answer sets in which the action ﬂush occurs when the toilet is unclogged. The paper [58] discusses in
detail how different types of control knowledge can be easily incorporated in answer set planning.
(3) Dealing with Complex Initial Situations: Section 6 discusses how CPasp can be easily adapted to handle disjunctive infor-
mation about the initial situations. This type of knowledge generates multiple branches in the search tree and can be
dealt with fairly eﬃciently by state-of-the-art sequential planners. Yet, the speciﬁcation of the initial situation in CPasp
and its extension described in Section 6 remains simple in the sense that the initial state can be expressed by a set of
facts. While this is adequate in all benchmarks found in the literature, the following example, discussed in [26], shows
that allowing the speciﬁcation of more complex initial situations is sometimes necessary and useful.
Example 9 (Complex initial situation). Assume that the packages in the bomb in the toilet domain are coming from differ-
ent sources belonging to one of two hierarchically structured organizations, called b (bad) and g (good). The hierarchies
are described in the usual way using relation link(D1, D2) which indicates that a department D1 is a subdivision of a
department D2. Organization g for instance can be represented by a collection of atoms:
link(d1, g)
link(d2, g)
link(d3,d1)
link(d4,d1)
15 http://planning.cis.strath.ac.uk/competition/.
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coming from the organization g are safe and the bomb is sent by someone working for b. There are packages labeled by
the name of the department the sender works for, which can be recorded by the atom from(P , D) – package P came from
department D . There are also some unlabeled packages. The initial situation of the modiﬁed bomb in the toilet problem
will be described by the program H consisting of the above atoms and the following rules which deﬁne the organization
the package came from and our trust in the good guys from g .
from(P , D2) ← from(P , D1), link(D1, D2)
h
(¬armed(P ),0)← from(P , g)
As usual, P ranges over packages and D ’s range over the departments. It is easy to see that such a program has a unique
answer set and can be used to specify the initial situation.
It is easy to see that for π(D) (as well as Γ (D)) to work with the planning problems with this type of initial situation,
we only need to replace the rule (18) by the above program.
10. Conclusion and future work
We deﬁne the notion of an approximation of action theories with static causal laws, concurrent actions, and incomplete
information. The proposed approximation is deterministic and can be computed eﬃciently, using either logic programs or
an imperative language (C++).
We develop two conformant planners using the proposed approximation, a logic programming based planner (called
CPasp) and a heuristic search based planner (CpA). CPasp can generate parallel plans and CpA is a sequential planner. Both
can handle disjunctive information about the initial state. Unlike many state-of-the-art conformant planners, these planners
deal directly with static causal laws. Their performance is comparable with state-of-the-art conformant planners over several
benchmark domains as well as over newly invented domains. Due to the simple heuristic used in the implementation of
CpA, we believe that the good performance of CpA lies in the use of the approximation. In a recent development, one
of the authors has worked to improve this aspect of CpA and entered an improved version of CpA into the International
Planning Competition. The improved version of CpA won the best prize in the conformant planning category.16 This result
and the development of these planners demonstrates that a careful study in approximated reasoning may pay off well in
the development of practical planners.
We also provide a suﬃcient condition for the completeness of the approximation. The condition is applicable to simple
action theories whose static causal laws are of a special form. We do believe that this condition can be extended to cover a
broader class of action theories. We leave this as one of our primary tasks in the near future. Furthermore, we would also
like to investigate the use of more informative heuristics in improving the performance of CpA.
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Appendix A. Proofs of Proposition 1 and Theorems 3 and 5
Suppose an action theory D is given. Let s be a state, δ be a partial state and a be an action. From Theorem 2, we have
the following result.
Lemma 1. Let A be an answer set of Φ(a, s) and let s′ = {l | h(l,1) ∈ A}. Then s′ is a state and 〈s,a, s′〉 ∈ T (D).
Since this appendix mainly deals with programs Φ(a, s) and Π(a, δ) (deﬁned by (17)), to simplify the proofs, we remove
from the programs atoms and rules that are of no interest.
First, let Φ0(a, s) (resp. Π0(a, δ)) denote the program obtained from Φ(a, s) (resp. Π(a, δ)) by removing its constraints.
16 http://ippc-2008.loria.fr/wiki/index.php/Results.
17 Some of these results have been reported in the proceedings of the 20th National Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence [62], the 8th International
Conference on Logic Programming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning Conference [61], and the 20th International Joint Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence [47].
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Proof. We need to ﬁnd a function λ which maps atoms in Π0(a, δ) into non-negative integers such that for every r in
Π0(a, δ) with the head y,
• λ(y) λ(x) for every atom x such that x appears in the body of r; and
• λ(y) > λ(x) for every atom x such that not x appears in the body of r.
It is easy to check that the following function λ satisﬁes the above property.
• λ(de(l,1)) = 1;
• λ(ph(l,1)) = 2;
• λ(h(l,1)) = 3; and
• λ(at) = 0 for any other atom at , e.g., λ(h(l,0)) = 0 for every ﬂuent literal l. 
Lemma 3. The program Π0(a, δ) is consistent and has a unique answer set.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 2 and [23]. 
Let X be the set of atoms of the forms ﬂuent(F ) and literal(L). Clearly X is a splitting set [36] of both Φ0(a, s) and
Π0(a, δ). It is easy to see that the bottom parts of Φ0(a, s) and Π0(a, δ) with respect to X are positive programs and have
only one answer set
U = {ﬂuent(F ), literal(F ), literal(neg(F )) ∣∣ F ∈ F} (A.1)
Let Φ1(a, s) and Π1(a, δ) denote the evaluation of the top parts of Φ0(a, s) and Π0(a, δ) with respect to U . The rules of
these programs are listed below (the condition for each rule follows the rule).
• Φ1(a, s) contains the following rules:
h(l,1) ← o(e,0),h(ψ,0) (A.2)([e causes l if ψ] ∈ D)
h(l,0) ← h(ψ,0) (A.3)([l if ψ] ∈ D)
h(l,1) ← h(ψ,1) (A.4)([l if ψ] ∈ D)
h(L,1) ← h(L,0),not h(¬L,1) (A.5)
h(s,0) ← (A.6)
h(a,0) ← (A.7)
• Π1(a, δ) contains the following rules:
h(l,1) ← o(e,0),h(ψ,0) (A.8)([e causes l if ψ] ∈ D)
de(l,1) ← o(e,0),h(ψ,0) (A.9)([e causes l if ψ] ∈ D)
ph(l,1) ← o(e,0),not h(¬ψ,0),not de(¬l,1) (A.10)([e causes l if ψ] ∈ D)
ph(L,1) ← not h(¬L,0),not de(¬L,1) (A.11)
h(l,0) ← h(ψ,0) (A.12)([l if ψ] ∈ D)
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ph(l,1) ← ph(ψ,1) (A.14)([l if ψ] ∈ D)
h(L,1) ← not ph(¬L,1) (A.15)
h(δ,0) ← (A.16)
h(a,0) ← (A.17)
Let Y be the set of atoms of the form o(e,0), h(l,0), or ph(l,0). Then it is easy to see that Y is a splitting set of both
Φ1(a, s) and Π1(a, δ).
Because s is a state, the bottom part of Φ1(a, s) with respect to Y has the unique answer set
V = o(a,0) ∪ h(s,0) (A.18)
Hence, the evaluation of the top part of Φ1(a, s) with respect to V is the following set of rules
h(l,1) ← (A.19)
(l is a direct effect of a in s)
h(l,1) ← h(ψ,1) (A.20)([l if ψ] ∈ D)
h(L,1) ← not h(¬L,1) (A.21)
(L holds in s)
Let Φ2(a, s) denote this program.
Lemma 4. A is an answer set of Φ(a, s) iff there exists an answer set A1 of Φ2(a, s) such that
A = U ∪ V ∪ A1
where U and V are deﬁned by (A.1) and (A.18). Furthermore, we have
h(l,1) ∈ A iff h(l,1) ∈ A1
Proof. By the splitting set theorem [36]. 
Similarly, because δ is a partial state, the bottom part of Π1(a, δ) has the unique answer set
W = o(a,0) ∪ h(δ,0) (A.22)
The evaluation of the top part of Π1(a, δ) with respect to W is the following set of rules
h(l,1) ← (A.23)
(l is a direct effect of a in δ)
de(l,1) ← (A.24)
(l is a direct effect of a in δ)
ph(l,1) ← not de(¬l,1) (A.25)
(l is a possible direct effect of a in δ)
ph(L,1) ← not de(¬L,1) (A.26)
(L possibly holds in δ)
h(l,1) ← h(ψ,1) (A.27)([l if ψ] ∈ D)
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h(L,1) ← not ph(¬L,1) (A.29)
Let us denote this program by Π2(a, δ).
Lemma 5. B is an answer set of Π0(a, δ) iff there exists an answer set B0 of Π2(a, δ) such that
B = U ∪ W ∪ B0 (A.30)
where U and W are deﬁned by (A.1) and (A.22). Furthermore, we have
h(l,1) ∈ B iff h(l,1) ∈ B0 (A.31)
Proof. It follows from the splitting set theorem. 
Let us further split the program Π2(a, δ) by using the splitting set consisting of atoms of the form de(l,1). The bottom
part of Π2(a, δ) contains only rules of the form (A.24) and thus it has the only answer set{
de(l,1)
∣∣ l is a direct effect of a}
Hence, the evaluation of the top part of Π2(a, δ) with respect to this answer set, denoted by Π3(a, δ), contains the following
rules:
h(l,1) ← (A.32)
(l is a direct effect of a in δ)
ph(l,1) ← (A.33)
(l is a possible direct effect of a in δ,¬l is not a direct effect of a)
ph(L,1) ← (A.34)
(L possibly holds in δ,¬L is not a direct effect of a) (A.35)
h(l,1) ← h(ψ,1) (A.36)([l if ψ] ∈ D)
ph(l,1) ← ph(ψ,1) (A.37)([l if ψ] ∈ D)
h(L,1) ← not ph(¬L,1) (A.38)
Lemma 6. B is an answer set of Π0(a, δ) iff there exists an answer set B1 of Π3(a, δ) such that
B = U ∪ W ∪ {de(l,1) ∣∣ l is a direct effect of a in δ}∪ B1 (A.39)
Furthermore, we have
h(l,1) ∈ B iff h(l,1) ∈ B1 (A.40)
Proof. It follows from Lemma 5 and the splitting set theorem. 
For a set of atoms X , let Φ X2 (a, s) (resp. Π
X
3 (a, δ)) denote the reduct of Φ2(a, s) (resp. Π3(a, δ)) with respect to X . That
is, Φ X2 (a, s) is the following set of rules:
h(l,1) ← (A.41)
(l is a direct effect of a in s)
h(l,1) ← h(ψ,1) (A.42)([l if ψ] ∈ D)
h(L,1) ← (A.43)(
L holds in s,h(¬L,1) /∈ X)
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h(l,1) ← (A.44)
(l is a direct effect of a in δ)
ph(l,1) ← (A.45)
(l is a possible direct effect of a in δ,¬l is not a direct effect of a)
ph(L,1) ← (A.46)
(L possibly holds in δ,¬L is not a direct effect of a)
h(l,1) ← h(ψ,1) (A.47)([l if ψ] ∈ D)
ph(l,1) ← ph(ψ,1) (A.48)([l if ψ] ∈ D)
h(L,1) ← (A.49)(
ph(¬L,1) /∈ X)
Let us prove the following lemma.
Lemma 7. Let A1 be an answer set of Φ2(a, s) and B1 be an answer set of Π3(a, δ). If δ ⊆ s then for any ﬂuent literal l, ph(l,1) ∈ B1
implies that h(l,1) ∈ A1 .
Proof. Suppose δ ⊆ s. Let P = Φ A12 (a, s) and Q = Π B13 (a, δ). Because A1 and B1 are answer sets of Φ2(a, s) and Π3(a, δ)
respectively, we have
A1 =
⋃
i
T iP (∅) (A.50)
B1 =
⋃
i
T iQ (∅) (A.51)
where T P and T Q are the immediate consequence operators of programs P and Q respectively.
First of all, we show that for any integer i  0 the following result holds
h(l,1) ∈ T iP (∅) ⇒ ph(l,1) ∈ T iQ (∅) (A.52)
Let us prove by induction on i.
(1) Base case: i = 0. (A.52) holds because T 0P (∅) = T 0Q (∅) = ∅.
(2) Inductive step: suppose (A.52) holds for i = k, we need to show that it also holds for i = k+ 1.
Let l be a ﬂuent literal such that h(l,1) ∈ T k+1P (∅). By the deﬁnition of T k+1P (∅), there are three cases
(a) h(l,1) holds in T k+1P (∅) by rule (A.41). This means that l is a direct effect of a in s. Observe that a direct effect of a in
s is always a possible direct effect of a in δ. Furthermore, because D is consistent, ¬l is not a direct effect of a in s.
Hence, ¬l is not a direct effect of a in δ. As a result, rule (A.45) belongs to Q , which implies that ph(l,1) ∈ T k+1Q (∅).
(b) h(l,1) holds in T k+1P (∅) by rule (A.42). This means that there exists a static causal law (2) such that
h(ψ,1) ⊆ T kP (∅)
By the inductive hypothesis, we have
ph(ψ,1) ⊆ T kQ (∅)
By rule (A.48), this implies that ph(l,1) ∈ T k+1Q (∅).
(c) h(l,1) holds in T k+1P (∅) by rule (A.43). This means that l holds in s and h(¬l,1) /∈ A1.
Because l holds in s, l possibly holds in δ. On the other hand, h(¬l,1) /∈ A1 implies that ¬l is not a direct effect of a
in s (because of rule (A.41)). Hence, ¬l is not a direct effect of a in δ. Accordingly, Q contains the rule of the form
(A.46) with L = l. Thus, it follows that ph(l,1) ∈ T k+1Q (∅).
As a result, (A.52) holds. The lemma directly follows from (A.52), (A.50), and (A.51). 
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h(l,1) ∈ A.
Proof. By Lemmas 4 and 6, the programs Φ2(a, s) and Π3(a, s) have answer sets A1 and B1, respectively, such that
A = U ∪ V ∪ A1
and
B = U ∪ W ∪ {de(l,1) ∣∣ l is a direct effect of a in δ}∪ B1
Let P and Q be programs deﬁned in Lemma 7. First of all, we will show that
h(l,1) ∈ T iQ (∅) ⇒ h(l,1) ∈ A1 (A.53)
for i  0 by using induction on i.
(1) Base case: trivial because there exist no ﬂuent literal l such that l ∈ T iQ (∅) = ∅.
(2) Inductive step: suppose (A.53) holds for i  k.
Let l be a ﬂuent literal such that h(l,1) ∈ T k+1Q (∅). We need to show that h(l,1) ∈ A1. Consider the following cases
(a) h(l,1) ∈ T k+1Q (∅) by rule (A.44). This means that l is a direct effect of a in δ. On the other hand, a direct effect
of a in δ is also a direct effect of a in s. As a result, l is a direct effect of a in s. By rule (A.19), this implies that
h(l,1) ∈ A1.
(b) h(l,1) ∈ T k+1Q (∅) by rule (A.47). This implies that h(ψ,1) ⊆ T kQ (∅). By the inductive hypothesis, we have h(ψ,1) ⊆
A1. As a result, by rule (A.20), it follows that h(l,1) ∈ A1.
(c) h(l,1) ∈ T k+1Q (∅) by rule (A.49). This implies that ph(¬l,1) /∈ B1. It follows from Lemma 7 that h(¬l,1) /∈ A1, i.e.,
h(¬l,1) /∈ A (A.54)
Let s′ = {g | h(g,1) ∈ A}. From (A.54), we have ¬l /∈ s′ . On the other hand, by Lemma 1, s′ is a state, which implies
that either l or ¬l belongs to s′ . Accordingly, we have l ∈ s′ . From this, it follows that h(l,1) ∈ A and thus h(l,1) ∈ A1.
From (A.53) and (A.51), we have
h(l,1) ∈ B1 ⇒ h(l,1) ∈ A1
On the other hand, by Lemmas 4 and 6, we have
h(l,1) ∈ A1 iff h(l,1) ∈ A
and
h(l,1) ∈ B1 iff h(l,1) ∈ B
Consequently, we can conclude that the lemma holds. 
Lemma 9. Π(a, δ) is consistent iff a is safe in δ.
Proof. Suppose Π(a, δ) is consistent. Let B denote the answer set of Π(a, δ). According to the deﬁnition of an answer set
of a program with constraints, B is an answer set of Π0(a, δ) and B does not violate constraints (6) and (8). This implies
that there exists no impossibility condition
impossible b if ψ
in D such that o(b,0) ⊆ B and h(¬ψ,0) ∩ B = ∅. Because o(a,0) is the set of all atoms of the form o(e,0), where e is an
elementary action, contained in B (see Lemma 5), there exists no impossibility condition
impossible b if ψ
such that b ⊆ a and ψ possibly holds in δ. By deﬁnition, this means a is safe in δ.
Now suppose that a is safe in δ. By Lemma 3, Π0(a, δ) has a unique answer set B . We will show that B is also an answer
set of Π(a, δ) by showing that it satisﬁes constraints (6) and (8):
(1) Constraint (6): Trivial because a is safe in δ.
(2) Constraint (8): Since δ is a partial state, there exists a state s such that δ ⊆ s. As a is safe in δ, it is executable in s.
By Theorem 3, it follows that the program Φ(a, s) has an answer set A and this answer set satisﬁes constraint (8). By
Lemma 8, it follows that B also satisﬁes constraint (8). 
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Proof. The lemma follows from Lemma 3 and from the fact that Π(a, δ) differs from the program Π0(a, δ) in two constraints
(6) and (8) only. 
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose Π(a, δ) is consistent. Lemma 10 implies that the only answer set of Π(a, δ) is the answer set of Π0(a, δ). Let
δ′ = {l ∣∣ h(l,1) ∈ B}
To complete the proof, we need to show that δ′ is a partial state. First of all, observe that δ′ satisﬁes all the static causal
laws of D because of constraint (5). So, we only need to show that there exists a state s′ such that δ′ ⊆ s′ .
Since δ is a partial state there exists a state s such that δ ⊆ s. Because Π(a, δ) is consistent, by Lemma 9, a is safe
in δ. Thus, it is executable in s. Since we assume D is consistent, there must be a state s′ such that 〈s,a, s′〉 ∈ T (D). By
Theorem 2, this implies that the program Φ(a, s) has an answer set A such that s′ = {l | h(l,1) ∈ A}. By Lemma 8, it is easy
to see that δ′ ⊆ s′ .
A.2. Proof of Theorem 3
Let 〈δ,a, δ′〉 be a transition in T lp(D). It follows from Deﬁnition 8 that the program Π(a, δ) is consistent and has an
answer set B such that δ′ = {l | h(l,1) ∈ B}. Note that by Lemma 10, such an answer set B is unique and it is also the
answer set of Π0(a, δ).
First, let us show that T lp(D) is an approximation of T (D). Clearly, to prove that, it suﬃces to show that for every
s ∈ comp(δ),
(1) a is executable in s;
(2) for every state s′ such that 〈s,a, s′〉 ∈ T (D), δ′ ⊆ s′ .
Consider a state s ∈ comp(δ). By Lemma 9, a is safe in δ. Because δ ⊆ s, a is executable in s. Now let s′ be a state such that
〈s,a, s′〉 ∈ T (D). By Theorem 2, this implies that there exists an answer set A of Φ(a, s) such that s′ = {l | h(l,1) ∈ A}. By
Lemma 8, we have δ′ = {l | h(l,1) ∈ B} ⊆ {l | h(l,1) ∈ A} = s′ .
We have showed that T lp(D) is an approximation of T (D). The determinism of T lp(D) follows directly from the fact that
B is unique.
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 5
This appendix contains the proof of Theorem 5. We assume that a planning problem P = 〈δ0,D, δ f 〉 is given. For the
sake of simplicity of the proof, similarly to the previous section, we will begin with a simpliﬁcation of the program π(P,n).
Let π0(P,n) be the program obtained from π(P,n) by removing constraints (6) and (8). Let X be the set of atoms of
the forms ﬂuent(F ) and literal(L). Then, X is a splitting set of π0(P,n). The bottom part of π0(P,n) is a positive program
and has a unique answer set U deﬁned by (A.1). Let π1(P,n) denote the evaluation of the top part of π0(P,n) with respect
to U .
Lemma 11. A set of atoms C is an answer set of π0(P,n) iff C = C1 ∪ U where C1 is an answer set of π1(P,n).
Proof. Follows from the splitting set theorem. 
For an integer 0  i  n, let Xi denote the set of atoms whose time parameters are less than or equal to i. Then, it is
easy to see that the sequence 〈Xi〉ni=0 is a splitting sequence [36] of π1(P,n).
Lemma 12. A set of atoms C1 is an answer set of π1(P,n) iff there is a sequence of sets of atoms 〈Di〉ni=0 such that the following
conditions are satisﬁed.
(1) D0 is an answer set of
μ0 = bX0
(
π1(P,n)
)
(B.1)
(2) For every 1 i  n, Di is an answer set of
μi = eXi
(
bXi
(
π1(P,n)
) \ bXi−1(π1(P,n)), ⋃
1 ji−1
D j
)
(B.2)
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C1 =
n⋃
i=0
Di (B.3)
where bX (P ) denote the bottom part of a program P with respect to X and eX (Q , V ) denote the evaluation of a program Q relative
to V .
Proof. Follows from the splitting sequence theorem [36]. 
Now suppose that C is an answer set of π(P,n). By deﬁnition C is also an answer set of π0(P,n) and C does not violate
any constraint of π(P,n). By Lemma 11, the program π1(P,n) has an answer set C1 such that C = C1 ∪ U . By Lemma 12,
it follows that there exists a sequence of sets of atoms 〈Di〉ni=0 that satisﬁes (B.1)–(B.3). Let δi = {l | h(l, i) ∈ Di} and let
ai = {l | o(e, i) ∈ Di}. It is easy to see that μ0 is the following set of rules
h(l,0) ← h(ψ,0) (B.4)([l if ψ] ∈ D)
h
(
δ0,0
)← (B.5)
o(E,0) ∨ ¬o(E,0) ← (B.6)
and for i  1, μi is the following set of rules
h(l, i) ← (B.7)
(l is a direct effect of ai−1 in δi−1)
de(l, i) ← (B.8)
(l is a direct effect of ai−1 in δi−1)
ph(l, i) ← not de(¬l, i) (B.9)
(l is a possible direct effect of ai−1 in δi−1)
ph(L, i) ← not de(¬L, i) (B.10)(
h(¬L, i − 1) /∈ Di−1
)
h(l, i) ← h(ψ, i) (B.11)([l if ψ] ∈ D)
ph(l, i) ← ph(ψ, i) (B.12)([l if ψ] ∈ D)
h(L, i) ← not ph(¬L, i) (B.13)
o(E,0) ∨ ¬o(E,0) ← (B.14)
Lemma 13. If δi−1 is a partial state then 〈δi−1,ai−1, δi〉 ∈ T lp(D).
Proof. Suppose δi−1 is a partial state. To prove that 〈δi−1,ai−1, δi〉 ∈ T lp(D) we need to show that Π(ai−1, δi−1) is consistent
and its only answer set B satisﬁes{
l
∣∣ h(l,1) ∈ B}= δi
First, observe that because C is an answer set of π(P,n), its satisﬁes the constraint (6). As a result, ai−1 is safe in δi−1. By
Lemma 9, this implies that Π(ai−1, δi−1) is consistent and thus, by Proposition 1, it has a unique answer set B . By Lemma 5,
the program Π2(ai−1, δi−1) (rules (A.23)–(A.29) with a = ai−1 and δ = δi−1) has an answer set B0 such that{
l
∣∣ h(l,1) ∈ B}= {l ∣∣ h(l,1) ∈ B0}
Furthermore, such B0 is unique because Π2(ai−1, δi−1) is stratiﬁed.
Observe that the program Π2(ai−1, δi−1) is the same as μi except that the time parameter of predicates in the former is
1 while it is i in the latter. Hence, we have
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l
∣∣ h(l,1) ∈ B0}= δi
That is, the lemma holds. 
Let us go back to the proof of Theorem 5. It is easy to see that δ0 = δ0 and thus it is a partial state. By Lemma 13, it
easy to see that for all 1 i  n we have 〈δi−1,ai−1, δi〉 ∈ T lp(D).
Hence, we have 〈δ0,α, δn〉 ∈ T lp(D). On the other hand, because C satisﬁes constraint (19), we have δ f ⊆ δn . Accordingly,
α is a solution of P . Thus, the theorem is proved.
Appendix C. Proofs of Propositions 2–4 and Theorem 6
This appendix contains the proofs of Propositions 2–4 and Theorem 6. We assume that a simple planning problem P is
given. In addition, for simplicity, we assume that the body of each static causal law of D has exactly one ﬂuent literal as
with some minor changes, the proofs in this appendix can be applied to simple action theories with arbitrary simple static
causal laws, including those with an empty body. To make the proofs easy to follow, let us deﬁne some notions.
Deﬁnition 17. Let a be an action and s be a state. A ﬂuent literal l is called an effect of a in s if either
(1) l is a direct effect of a in s; or
(2) D contains a static causal law
l if g
such that g is an effect of a in s.
Deﬁnition 18. Let a be an action and δ be a state. A ﬂuent literal l is called a possible effect of a in δ iff either
(1) l is a possible direct effect of a in δ; or
(2) l possibly holds by inertia, i.e., l possibly holds in δ and ¬l is not a direct effect of a in δ; or
(3) D contains a static causal law
l if g
such that g is a possible effect of a in δ.
The proofs in this appendix will make use of programs Φ2(a, s) (rules (A.19)–(A.21)) and Π3(a, δ) (rules (A.32)–(A.38))
and some results from Appendices A and B.
Let s and s′ be states, δ and δ′ be partial states and a be an action such that 〈s,a, s′〉 ∈ T (D) and 〈δ,a, δ′〉 ∈ T lp(D). By
Theorems 2 and 3, and Deﬁnition 8, the programs Φ(a, s) and Π(a, δ) have answer sets A and B , respectively, such that
s′ = {l ∣∣ h(l,1) ∈ A} (C.1)
and
δ′ = {l ∣∣ h(l,1) ∈ B} (C.2)
By Lemmas 4 and 6, this implies that the programs Φ2(a, δ) and Π3(a, δ) have answer sets A1 and B1 respectively such
that
A = U ∪ V ∪ A1 (C.3)
B = U ∪ W ∪ {de(l,1) ∣∣ l is a direct effect of a in δ}∪ B1 (C.4)
where U , V , and W are deﬁned by (A.1) and (A.18), and (A.22). Furthermore, we have
h(l,1) ∈ A iff h(l,1) ∈ A1 (C.5)
h(l,1) ∈ B iff h(l,1) ∈ B1 (C.6)
Let P and Q be the reducts of Φ2(a, s) and Π3(a, δ) with respect to A1 and B1 respectively. That is, P is the set of rules
(A.41)–(A.43) where X = A1, and Q is the set of rules (A.44)–(A.49) where X = B1.
Lemma 14. If g /∈ s and h(g,1) ∈ A1 then g is an effect of a in s.
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h(g,1) ∈ T iP (∅) then g is an effect of a in s. We prove this by induction on i.
(1) Base case: i = 0. Trivial because there exists no ﬂuent literal g such that h(g,1) ∈ T 0P (∅) = ∅.
(2) Inductive step: Suppose the lemma holds for i  k. We will show that it also holds for i = k+ 1. Let g be a ﬂuent literal
such that
g /∈ s ∧ h(g,1) ∈ T k+1P (∅)
Because g does not hold in s, the rule (A.43) with L = g does not belong to P . As a result, there are two possibilities
for h(g,1) ∈ T k+1P (∅):
(a) g is a direct effect of a in s. By Deﬁnition 17, g is an effect of a in s.
(b) D contains a static causal law
g if h (C.7)
such that
h(h,1) ∈ T kP (∅) (C.8)
It is easy to see that
h /∈ s (C.9)
because if otherwise, we would have g ∈ s (note that s is a state and thus it satisﬁes static causal law (C.7)).
From (C.8) and (C.9) and by the inductive hypothesis, it follows that h is an effect of a in s. Hence, by Deﬁnition 17,
g is also an effect of a in s. 
Lemma 15. If ph(g,1) ∈ B1 then g is a possible effect of a in δ.
Proof. Let i  0 be an arbitrary integer. Clearly, to prove the lemma, it suﬃces to show that
if ph(g,1) ∈ T iQ (∅) then g is a possible effect of a in δ (C.10)
Let us prove (C.10) by induction on i.
(1) Base case: i = 0. Trivial because there is no i such that ph(g,1) ∈ T 0Q (∅) = ∅.
(2) Inductive step: Suppose (C.10) is true for i  k. We will show that it is also true for i = k+ 1.
Let g be a ﬂuent literal such that ph(g,1) ∈ T k+1Q (∅). Recall that Q is the set of rules of the form (A.44)–(A.49) where
X = B1. Hence, there are three possibilities for ph(g,1) ∈ T k+1Q (∅).
(a) g is a possible direct effect of a in δ and ¬g is not a direct effect of a in δ. By deﬁnition, g is also a possible effect
of a in δ.
(b) g possibly holds in δ and ¬g is not a direct effect of a in δ. By deﬁnition, in this case g is also a possible effect of
a in δ.
(c) D contains a static causal law
g if h
such that ph(h,1) ∈ T kQ (∅). By the inductive hypothesis, h is a possible effect of a in δ. Hence, by Deﬁnition 18, g is
also a possible effect of a in δ.
So, (C.10) is true. The lemma follows directly from this result. 
We will also need the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Let D be a simple action theory. Let 〈s,a, s′〉 ∈ T (D) and 〈δ,a, δ′〉 ∈ T lp(D). If δ ⊆ s then for every ﬂuent literal
l ∈ s′ \ δ′ , we have l  (s \ δ).
Proof. Suppose δ ⊆ s and l be a ﬂuent literal in s′ \ δ′ . We need to show that there exists a ﬂuent literal g ∈ s \ δ such that
l  g .
If l ∈ s \ δ then the proposition is trivial because by deﬁnition, l depends on itself and thus we can take g = l ∈ s \ δ to
have l  g . Now, consider the case that l /∈ s \ δ. There are two possibilities
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(2) l ∈ δ.
Let us consider each possibility in turn.
(1) l /∈ s. As l ∈ s′ \ δ′ , we have l ∈ s′ . This implies that h(l,1) ∈ A1. According to Lemma 14, l is an effect of a in s. It follows
from Deﬁnition 17, that one of the following two cases occurs
(a) D contains a dynamic causal law
e causes l if ψ
such that e ∈ a and ψ holds in s.
If ψ holds in δ then l is a direct effect of a in δ. By rule (A.44), we have h(l,1) ∈ B1, i.e., l ∈ δ′ . This contradicts to
l ∈ s′ \ δ′ .
Because ψ holds in s and does not hold in δ, we have
ψ ⊆ s and ψ  δ
As a result, there exists a ﬂuent literal g ∈ ψ such that g ∈ s \ δ. By the deﬁnition of dependencies (Deﬁnition 11),
we have l  g .
(b) D contains a dynamic causal law e causes l0 if ψ and a sequence of static causal laws [l1 if l0], [l2 if l1], . . . ,
[ln if ln−1], [l if ln] such that e ∈ a and ψ holds in s.
If ψ holds in δ then by rule (A.44), we have l0 ∈ δ′; on the other hand, because δ′ is closed under the static causal
laws of D, it follows that l ∈ δ′; this contradicts to the assumption l ∈ s′ \ δ′ .
So, we have ψ does not hold in δ. Similarly to previous case, this implies that there exists a ﬂuent literal g ∈ ψ
such that g ∈ s \ δ. Hence, we have
l  ln  ln−1  · · ·  l0  g
(2) l ∈ δ.
First, we will show that ph(¬l,1) ∈ B1. Since l /∈ δ′ , we have h(l,1) /∈ B1. By rule (A.49), it follows that ph(¬l,1) ∈ B1.
According to Lemma 15, ph(¬l,1) ∈ B1 implies that ¬l is a possible effect of a in δ. By the deﬁnition of a possible effect
(Deﬁnition 18), we have the following three cases
(a) ¬l is a possible direct effect of a in δ. That is, D contains a dynamic causal law
e causes ¬l if ψ
such that e ∈ a and ψ possibly holds in δ. This implies that
¬ψ ∩ δ = ∅ (C.11)
As l ∈ s′ and s′ is a state, we have ¬l /∈ s′ . This means that h(¬l,1) /∈ A. By rule (A.41), it follows that ¬l is not a
direct effect of a in s. Hence, ψ does not hold in s, i.e.,
¬ψ ∩ s = ∅ (C.12)
From (C.11) and (C.12), it follows that there exists a ﬂuent literal g ∈ ¬ψ such that g ∈ s \ δ. Because
[e causes ¬l if ψ] belongs to D, this implies that ¬l  ¬g . By the deﬁnition of dependencies, it follows that
l  g .
(b) l does not hold in δ and l is not a direct effect of a. Because l ∈ δ, this case never happens.
(c) D contains a sequence of static causal laws
[l1 if l0], [l2 if l1], . . . , [ln if ln−1], [¬l if ln]
such that l0 is a possible effect of a in δ or l0 possibly holds by inertia.
(i) l0 is a possible direct effect of a. By deﬁnition, this means that D contains a dynamic causal law
e causes l0 if ψ
such that e ∈ a and ψ possibly holds in δ.
As ψ possibly holds in δ, we have
¬ψ ∩ δ = ∅ (C.13)
On the other hand, it is easy to see that ψ does not hold in s as if otherwise, we would have ¬l ∈ s′ , which
contradicts to the assumption l ∈ s′ . Therefore, we have
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By (C.13) and (C.14), there exists a ﬂuent literal g ∈ s \ δ such that ¬g ∈ ψ . It is easy to see that
¬l  ln  ln−1  · · ·  l0  ¬g
Hence, we have l  g .
(ii) l0 possibly holds by inertia. This means that l0 possibly holds in δ and ¬l is not a direct effect of a in δ.
It is easy to see that l0 does not hold in s as if otherwise, we would have ¬l ∈ s′ , which is impossible due to
l ∈ s′ . Because s is a state, it follows that ¬l0 ∈ s.
As l0 possibly holds in δ and ¬l0 ∈ s, we have ¬l0 ∈ s \ δ. On the other hand, by the deﬁnition of dependencies,
we have l  ¬l0. Accordingly, we can select g = ¬l0 ∈ s \ δ to have l  g . 
C.1. Proof of Proposition 2
By the deﬁnition of σ (Deﬁnition 13), δ is a subset of every state s in S . Hence, the right-hand side of the equation of
the proposition is a subset of the left-hand side. Therefore, to prove the lemma, it is suﬃcient to show that(⋂
s∈S
s
)
∩ σ ⊆ δ ∩ σ
Suppose otherwise, that is, there exists a ﬂuent literal l such that l ∈ (⋂s∈S s) ∩ σ but l /∈ δ ∩ σ . This implies that (i) l ∈ σ ,
and (ii) l ∈ s \ δ for every s ∈ S . The latter implies that l  (s \ δ) for every s ∈ S . By the deﬁnition of , S σ δ. This is a
contradiction.
C.2. Proof of Proposition 3
(1) Assume that a is not safe in δ. That means there exists an impossibility condition
impossible b if ψ
such that b ⊆ a and ψ possibly holds in δ, i.e.,
¬ψ ∩ δ = ∅ (C.15)
By the deﬁnition of , S σ δ implies that there exists a state s ∈ S such that b  (s \ δ). Because a is executable in s,
ψ does not hold in s, i.e., ψ  s. Because s is a complete set of ﬂuent literals, it follows that
¬ψ ∩ s = ∅ (C.16)
By (C.15) and (C.16), there exists a ﬂuent literal l ∈ (s \ δ) such that l ∈ ¬ψ . By the deﬁnition of dependencies, we have
b  l and this is a contradiction because b (s \ δ).
(2) Let S ′ = Res(a, S).
Consider an arbitrary state s ∈ S . Because a is executable in S , it follows from the previous item that a is safe in δ. By
Lemma 9, Proposition 1, and the deﬁnition of T lp(D), it follows that there exists a (unique) partial state δ′ such that
〈δ,a, δ′〉 ∈ T lp(D). We need to show that S ′ σ δ′ .
Suppose otherwise, that is, S ′ σ δ′ . Then, there are two possible cases (note that because δ ⊆ s for every s ∈ S , by
Theorem 3, δ′ ⊆ s′ for every s′ ∈ S):
(a) there exists a ﬂuent literal l ∈ σ such that l (s′ \ δ′) for every s′ ∈ S ′ .
Let l be such a ﬂuent literal. Consider an arbitrary state s ∈ S and let 〈s,a, s′〉 be a transition in T (D). Furthermore,
let g ∈ s′ \ δ′ such that l  g . By Proposition 6, because g ∈ s′ \ δ′ , there must be a ﬂuent literal h ∈ s \ δ such that
g  h. Because of the transitivity of , we have l  h. This implies that
l  (s \ δ) (C.17)
Because s can be any arbitrary state in S , (C.17) implies that S σ δ. This is a contradiction.
(b) there exists an action b such that b  (s′ \ δ′) for every s′ ∈ S ′ .
Consider an arbitrary state s ∈ S and let 〈s,b, s′〉 be a transition in T (D). Furthermore, let l ∈ s′ \ δ′ be a ﬂuent
literal such that b  l. By Proposition 6, because l ∈ s′ \ δ′ , there exists a ﬂuent literal g in s \ δ such that l  g . By the
deﬁnition of dependencies, it follows that b  g ∈ (s \ δ). Hence, we have
b  (s \ δ) (C.18)
Because s can be any arbitrary state in S , (C.18) implies that S σ δ. This is a contradiction.
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Let α = 〈a0,a1, . . . ,an−1〉. For i  0, let α[i] denote the chain of the initial i events of α, i.e., α[i] = 〈a0,a1, . . . ,ai−1〉. We
will prove the proposition by induction on the length n of α.
(1) Base case: n = 0.
Item 1 is trivial. Item 2 is true because Res(α, S) = S σ δ, 〈δ, 〈〉, δ〉 ∈ T lp(D) and T lp(D) is deterministic.
(2) Inductive Step: Suppose the proposition is true for n k. We need to show that it is true for n = k + 1.
Let Si = Res(α[i], S) and let δi be the partial state such that 〈δ,α[i], δi〉 ∈ T lp(D). Clearly to prove the inductive step, we
only need to show that
(a) ak is safe in δk , and
(b) Sk+1 σ δk+1.
By the inductive hypothesis, we have Sk σ δk . By Proposition 3, it follows that ak is safe in δk and Sk+1 σ δk+1.
C.4. Proof of Theorem 6
This theorem follows directly from Proposition 4 and the deﬁnition of a simple planning problem (Deﬁnition 14). If P
has no solution then it is trivial. Suppose that P has a solution, say, α = 〈a0, . . . ,an−1〉. We will show that π(P,n) is
consistent.
Because α is a solution of P , there exists a sequence of sets of states 〈S〉ni=0 such that
(1) S0 = comp(δ0);
(2) Si = Res(ai−1, Si−1) for i  1;
(3) δ f ⊆ s for every s ∈ Sn .
According to Proposition 4, there exists a sequence of partial states 〈δi〉ni=0 such that δ0 = δ0 and Sn δ f δn . By Proposi-
tion 2, we have δ f ⊆ δn .
Let us construct a sequence of sets of atoms Di as follows:
D0 = h
(
δ0,0
)∪ o(a0,0) ∪ ¬o(A \ a0,0)
for 1 i  n− 1,
Di = h(l, δi) ∪ o(ai, i) ∪ ¬o(A \ ai, i)
{
de(l, i)
∣∣ l ∈ de(ai−1, δi−1)}∪ {ph(l, i) ∣∣ l ∈ ph(ai−1, δi−1)}
and
Dn =
{
h(l,n)
∣∣ l ∈ δn}∪ {de(l,n) ∣∣ l ∈ de(an−1, δn−1)}∪ {ph(l,n) ∣∣ l ∈ ph(an−1, δn−1)}
It is easy to see that for 0 i  n, Di is an answer set of μi (deﬁned previously in Appendix B). By Lemma 12, C1 =⋃ni=0 Di
is an answer set of π1(P,n). As a result, by Lemma 11, C = C1 ∪ U is an answer set of π0(P,n).
We will show that C is also an answer set of π(P,n). Because π(P,n) is the program π0(P,n) with additional con-
straints (6), (8), (19), and (21), all we need to do is to show that C does not violate any of these constraints. For (6) and
(8), it is trivial because δi is a partial state and〈δi−1,ai−1, δi〉 ∈ T lp(D). Constraint (19) is satisﬁed by C because δ f ⊆ δn .
Constraint (21) is satisﬁed because ai is an action, i.e., a non-empty set of elementary actions.
Hence, C is an answer set of π(P,n). This means that the program π(P,n) is consistent. As a result, the theorem holds.
Appendix D. Proof of Theorem 8
We begin with a lemma about the operator ClD that will be used in the proof.
Given an action theory D, for a set of ﬂuent literals σ , let
Λ(σ) = σ ∪ {l ∣∣ ∃[l if ψ] ∈ D such that ψ ⊆ σ} (D.1)
Let Λ0(σ ) = σ and Λi+1(σ ) = Λ(Λi(σ )) for i  0. Since, by the deﬁnition of Λ, for any set of ﬂuent literals σ ′ we have
σ ′ ⊆ Λ(σ ′), the sequence 〈Λi(σ )〉∞i=0 is monotonic with respect to the set inclusion operation. In addition, 〈Λi(σ )〉∞i=0 is
bounded by the set of ﬂuent literals. Thus, there exists σ limit such that
σ limitD =
∞⋃
i=0
Λi(σ ) (D.2)
Furthermore, σ limit is unique and satisﬁes all static causal laws in D.D
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Proof. By induction we can easily show that Λi(σ ) ⊆ ClD(σ ) for all i  0. Hence, we have
σ limitD ⊆ ClD(σ )
Furthermore, from the construction of Λi(σ ), it follows that σ limit satisﬁes all static causal laws in D. Because of the
minimality property of ClD(σ ), we have
ClD(σ ) ⊆ σ limitD
Accordingly, we have
σ limitD = ClD(σ ) 
Lemma 17. For every set of ﬂuent literals σ , Closure(D,σ ) = ClD(σ ).
Proof. It is easy to see that the function Closure(D,σ ) is a straightforward computation of σ limitD (Eqs. (D.2) and (D.1)).
Hence, by Lemma 16, we have Closure(D,σ ) = ClD(σ ). 
The following lemma shows a code fragment that correctly computes the closure of a set of ﬂuent literals.
Lemma 18. Let i  0 be an arbitrary integer, and x be a binary predicate symbol. For any set σ of ﬂuent literals, the following program
x(l, i) ← (l ∈ σ)
x(l, i) ← x(ψ, i) ([l if ψ] ∈ D)
has the unique answer set {x(l, i) | l ∈ ClD(σ )}.
Proof. By the deﬁnition of an answer set of a positive program, it is easy to see that the above program has the unique
answer set {x(l, i) | l ∈ σ limitD } = {x(l, i) | l ∈ ClD(σ )} (see Lemma 16). 
Let a be an action and δ be a partial state such that Π(a, δ) is consistent. By Proposition 1, Π(a, δ) has a unique answer
set, say B . Let lit denote the set of all ﬂuent literals, i.e., lit = F∪ ¬F. We deﬁne
de(a, δ) = {l | l is a direct effect of a in δ} (D.3)
pde(a, δ) = {l | l is a possible direct effect of a in δ} (D.4)
ph(a, δ) = ClD
((
pde(a, δ) ∪ (lit \ ¬δ)) \ de(a, δ)) (D.5)
Then, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 19. For any ﬂuent literal l, h(l,1) ∈ B iff l ∈ ClD(de(a, δ) ∪ (lit \ ¬ph(a, δ))).
Proof. Because B is an answer set of Π(a, δ), it is also an answer set of Π0(a, δ) (recall that Π0(a, δ) is the program
obtained from Π(a, δ) by removing constraints).
According to Lemma 6, there exists an answer set B1 of the program Π3(a, δ) (rules (A.32)–(A.38)) such that (A.39) and
(A.40) hold.
It is easy to see that X = {ph(l,1) | l ∈ lit} is a splitting set of Π3(a, δ). The bottom part of Π3(a, δ) with respect to X is
the following set of rules
ph(l,1) ←
(l is a possible direct effect of a in δ,¬l is not a direct effect of a)
ph(L,1) ←
(L possibly holds in δ,¬L is not a direct effect of a)
ph(l,1) ← ph(ψ,1)([l if ψ] ∈ D)
which can be rewritten to (see (D.3) and (D.4) for the deﬁnition of de(a, δ) and pde(a, δ))
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l ∈ (pde(a, δ) \ ¬de(a, δ))∪ (lit \ ¬(δ ∪ de(a, δ))))
ph(l,1) ← ph(ψ,1)([l if ψ] ∈ D)
By Lemma 17, this program has a unique answer set (see (D.5) for the deﬁnition of ph(a, δ))
M = {ph(l,1) ∣∣ l ∈ ph(a, δ)}
Hence, the evaluation of the top part of Π3(a, δ) with respect to M is the following set of rules:
h(l,1) ←(
l ∈ de(a, δ))
h(l,1) ← h(ψ,1)([l if ψ] ∈ D)
h(L,1) ←(¬l /∈ ph(a, δ))
Again, by Lemma 17, this program has a unique answer set (note that (¬l /∈ ph(a, δ)) ⇔ (l ∈ (lit \ ¬ph(a, δ)))):
N = {h(l,1) ∣∣ l ∈ ClD(de(a, δ) ∪ (lit \ ¬ph(a, δ)))}
By the splitting set theorem, we have B1 = M ∪ N . Hence by (A.40), we have(
h(l,1) ∈ B) ⇔ (l ∈ ClD(de(a, δ) ∪ (lit \ ¬ph(a, δ))))
Hence, the lemma holds. 
We now show that Theorem 8 holds. By Lemma 18, it is easy to see that Res(D,a, δ) = ClD(de(a, δ) ∪ (lit \ ¬ph(a, δ))).
By Lemma 19, it follows that Theorem 8 holds.
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